Insurance Pricing Optimization via Off-Policy Evaluation

We study offline inference for the optimal value in reinforcement learning under finite state and action spaces. Two new nuisances are derived as fixed points of a self-induced Bellman equation, in which we approximate the maximum Bellman operator by its softmax correspondence. We propose a debiased estimator through the Neyman orthogonality and establish its asymptotic normality under diverging horizons even when the behavior policy changes with time, as long as the nuisances have the statistical rates that can be achieved by many machine learning methods. We provide a concrete estimating procedure for these nuisances and show they can lead to valid inference. Synthetic experiments validate the numerical performance of our inference method, and we implement it in real-life decision-making problems, including bike repositioning and AI agentic tool use.

Resource-constrained pricing controllers can make fixed-price inference impossible: the controller's resource state may remove the target price neighborhood from the feasible set, even when every realized action has a known positive density. We formalize this support-exclusion failure through a local non-identification result and a realized information clock. We then design a target-aware pricing controller that certifies feasible target bands and logs continuous local densities. Localized debiasing gives studentized intervals whose width is governed by this clock. The resulting regret--information accounting, stated up to pilot re-solving error, shows that cheap exploration can be insufficient for inference: polynomial target mass gives polynomial rates, while a pure $1/t$ target branch does not yield shrinking fixed-target intervals without additional local movement. Experiments show calibration in certified bands and diagnostic abstention when the resource state collapses target support.

Agentic AI introduces new insurance challenges because autonomous AI systems can make decisions, invoke tools, modify external environments, and interact with third-party services. This paper develops an AI-native mathematical framework for underwriting, pricing, and contract design for agentic AI deployments. A deployment is represented by a risk state that captures autonomy level, operational authority, permission exposure, governance maturity, and dependency concentration. The framework maps the risk state to event probabilities, loss severities, governance costs, premiums, deductibles, coverage allocation, and policy covenants, and formulates an optimization problem for insurance contract design under participation, profitability, and incentive compatibility constraints. The paper establishes structural properties of insurability, including characterization of an insurability region, monotone deterioration of feasibility with increasing exposure, and governance certification thresholds. Insurance is further interpreted as both an operational cost and a regulatory mechanism for AI deployment. A healthcare case study illustrates contract optimization, sensitivity analysis, and automated claims processing for agentic AI systems.