Calibrating Conservatism for Scalable Oversight

AI agents pose significant risks as they are granted increasing autonomy. A commonly proposed solution is human oversight and keeping a ''human in the loop'', but this is not a simple solution: Not only do current approaches to AI agent design impede effective human oversight, but the cognitive capacities required for it are also themselves degraded by extended use of AI systems. This position paper argues that current approaches to the development and deployment of AI agent systems do not support effective human oversight -- they contribute to its degradation. To address this, a top priority in the advancement of AI agents should be supporting the situated goals and cognitive requirements of effective human oversight, treating the human needs of overseers at the same level of importance as AI agent capability. To put this idea into practice, we connect work on automation and human-computer interaction to AI agent processes, outlining design-level affordances and organizational protocols that (1) support overseers in exercising critical judgement and (2) counteract the skill atrophy that arises from extended use of automation. We urge developers and deployers to adopt these or similar approaches. Without explicit support for the cognitive demands of effective human-agent interaction, AI agent systems will continue to passively incentivize the degradation of the very human skills they rely on.

AI systems increasingly delegate decisions to specialized models, evaluators, tools, and supervisory controllers. The central AI problem is no longer only model accuracy, but uncertainty-aware governance: how much autonomy to grant, which evidence should calibrate trust, what performance ceiling a delegated AI system can sustain, and when human intervention becomes necessary. We propose the Minimum Sufficient Oversight Principle (MSO), a variational principle for principled autonomy delegation: minimize governance burden on the Fisher information manifold subject to a delivery constraint. The resulting Euler-Lagrange solution yields a water-filling allocation of governed delegation across the task space. Building on a revealed-action governed delegation channel model, we prove a capacity theorem for stationary symbolwise review policies, derive a local first-order approximation relating workflow complexity to quality degradation, and give a drift-dominated autonomy-time scaling law linking intervention timing to effective capacity, complexity, and drift. Within this framework, masking appears as a structural AI-governance pathology: corrected performance can hide the competence signal needed to calibrate trust. Synthetic simulations and a semi-real reconstructed workflow support design prescriptions including upstream-first correction, sensitivity-based intervention, and explicit feasibility checks before autonomy is expanded. The result is a computable framework for uncertainty, planning, and oversight in delegated AI systems. A companion Python package is available at https://github.com/crbazevedo/delegation-lab.

Runtime oversight for LLM agents is commonly framed as scalar risk prediction: estimate failure likelihood, confidence, or uncertainty, then intervene once the score crosses a threshold. We argue that this framing targets the wrong object for control. The relevant question is not how likely the agent is to fail if it continues, but whether an available intervention would improve the outcome. Two trajectory prefixes can have the same risk estimate while requiring different actions, because one remains recoverable and the other does not. We formalize this mismatch as target error and identify intervention advantage, the expected utility gain from intervening rather than continuing, as the decision object for oversight. To measure this mismatch, we introduce prefix branching, a same-prefix counterfactual protocol that executes candidate actions from identical trajectory states. Across four benchmarks, action-conditioned control yields regime-dependent gains over scalar routing. In a calibration decomposition, recalibrating the same scalar score improves prediction metrics but leaves control regret unchanged, showing that calibration alone does not repair target error. A simple prefix-only action-conditioned controller substantially reduces regret in the strongest interactive regime, from 0.506 to 0.110 on ALFWorld. Gains shrink when interventions are weak or when scalar routing already preserves intervention-relevant information. These results suggest that LLM-agent oversight should move from calibrated risk scoring toward action-conditioned value estimation.