Knowledge editing methods such as ROME and MEMIT update factual associations in transformer models by modifying MLP weights. While evaluated mainly by output behavior, their internal mechanism remains underexplored. We investigate whether edits rely on a common mechanism, regardless of which fact is modified. Despite fact-specific weight changes, we argue that ROME and MEMIT target the same subset of weights critical for maintaining edits. To isolate this subset, we train a compact binary mask over the edited weights. The mask reverses 80% of edits on the training set and over 70% on the test set, confirming that diverse edits share a common functional structure. Our analysis reveals that the mask reverses edits by eliminating overattention in later layers. Additionally, we show that injecting the mask during editing drops editing success from 98% to 38%, demonstrating that this mechanism is necessary for edits to succeed. Our finding that edits suppress rather than overwrite knowledge explains why ROME and MEMIT fail to propagate changes to related facts. The identified common functional subspace informs detection and defense against unwanted edits.
Knowledge editing aims to update or correct factual knowledge in a language model. A widely used approach, locate-then-edit, first localizes a fact within the model and then edits the weights there. To date, such methods have been developed exclusively for autoregressive models (ARMs). Whether they work for masked diffusion models (MDMs), which model text bidirectionally and generate by iterative denoising rather than next-token prediction, remains an open question. We address it by transferring locate-then-edit to MDMs and comparing multiple MDMs with their matched ARMs. Our central finding has two parts. First, where an edit should be applied transfers between them: the same early-to-mid-layer MLP at the last subject token is most effective for both. Second, this shared location does not guarantee a shared outcome. Single-token edits succeed in both, but as targets grow longer, editing degrades far more sharply in the MDMs than in the ARMs. The failure stems from how the edited fact is generated: producing a multi-token target passes through intermediate states in which the target is partially unmasked, for which the edit was never optimized. Guided by this diagnosis, we introduce a simple correction that optimizes the edit including such states, substantially restoring multi-token performance. Our code is available at https://github.com/holi-lab/MDM-KE.
Knowledge editing (KE) offers a lightweight alternative to retraining for updating large language models (LLMs). Meanwhile, fine-tuning remains the default operation for adapting LLMs to new domains and tasks. Despite their widespread adoption, these two post-training interventions have been studied in isolation, leaving open a crucial question: if we fine-tune an edited model, do the edits survive? This question is motivated by practical objectives: removing covert or malicious edits, and preserving beneficial edits. If fine-tuning impairs edits (Fig.1), current KE methods become less efficient, as a newly fine-tuned model requires re-editing; if edits persist, fine-tuned models risk propagating hidden malicious edits, raising serious safety concerns. To this end, we systematically quantify edit decay after fine-tuning across 254 experimental configurations. Our results show that in general, edits decay substantially after subsequent fine-tuning. AlphaEdit exhibits the greatest decay on the zsRE benchmark when applied to GPT-J, where 25.27% of previously successful edits become unsuccessful after fine-tuning. We further find that fine-tuning only the edited layers is sufficient to effectively remove edits, while incurring only modest degradation in downstream performance. Surprisingly, fine-tuning non-edited layers leads to greater edit decay than all-layer fine-tuning. Besides, our activation space analysis reveals that fine-tuning produces a larger and more coherent representational shift, both in magnitude and direction, than KE. Overall, our study underscores the necessity of evaluating KE within the broader LLM application pipeline.
Knowledge Editing (KE) has emerged as a frontier for updating specific facts in LLMs without costly retraining, but its reliability and underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we examine KE from an adversarial elicitation perspective, revealing that edited knowledge is often not fully erased and continues to surface, with consistent failures observed across diverse model architectures. To explain this behavior, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of popular KE methods. We show that low-rank updates do not overwrite existing knowledge but instead redistribute it within the model's representation space. Furthermore, we find that these methods act as targeted suppression mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of expressing original facts, rather than removing them from the model. Analysis of the loss landscape reveals that edited knowledge lies in narrow, anisotropic regions that are highly sensitive to perturbations, making them highly vulnerable to indirect prompting and adversarial attacks. By exposing these profound architectural vulnerabilities, our work proves that KE algorithms are inherently bypassable and motivates a fundamental reevaluation of how we deploy post-hoc updates in several LLM applications.