cs.CRMay 27, 2026
SaveDomain-Informed Representation for Evolutionary Sieving in Integral and Module Lattices
Organizations: University of Oklahoma, Norman OK 73019, USA
Abstract
Traditional cryptography, rooted in problems, e.g., integer factorisation or discrete log, is inevitably vulnerable to a fully operational quantum computer. Although it remains an engineering frontier, the looming threat extends to encrypted data stored today, which could be decrypted in the future with quantum capabilities. To safeguard against this eventuality, the backbone of the modern quantum-safe cryptography is the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). We enhance Laarhoven's treatment of Ajtai et al.'s sieving as a genetic algorithm (GA) for the SVP by incorporating domain-informed SVP representation and crossover while naturally extending application to the module lattices.
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