Realistic honeypot evaluations for scheming propensity

We introduce Gram, an automated alignment auditing framework to assess the propensity of AI agents to engage in sabotage. We evaluate Gemini models across 17 simulated agentic deployment scenarios that incentivize sabotage. We find Gemini models misbehave in about 2-3% of our simulated trajectories. Many of these cases are explained by "overeagerness" in Gemini models resulting in both excessive role-playing and goal-seeking behavior. In contrast to other alignment auditing approaches, Gram is designed to specifically evaluate misalignment and intentional sabotage in agentic coding and research agents. We additionally introduce an experimental investigator agent pipeline which enables fine-grained targeted experiments to identify the drivers of misbehavior. We find that increasing realism of environments and removing nudges to misbehave tends to reduce sabotage rates close to zero.

The increasing situational awareness of language models raises safety concerns: models might be aware when they are evaluated, and adjust their behavior to evade monitoring and resist modification, e.g., pretending to be aligned only in evaluation. This alignment faking behavior is often interpreted as scheming: an intentional effort of strategic deception. In this paper, we examine an alternative interpretation, performative misalignment, which explains the change in behavior as a result of sycophancy towards AI researchers. To examine this hypothesis, we present three empirical findings. First, we show that evaluation awareness persists even when we tell models they are deployed, which contradicts the scheming story which predicts less misalignment when the model perceives evaluation. Second, we use probing and steering to show that our current methods cannot mechanistically distinguish sycophancy and scheming in alignment faking evaluations. Third, we fine-tune models to be more sycophantic and observe increased sensitivity to evaluation cues. To conclude, we emphasize deconfounding sycophancy from scheming for future work on evaluations and mitigations of intent misalignment.

Safety evaluations often infer latent motivations from behavioral patterns, but the construct validity of these inferences is unclear. We study this problem in alignment faking, where models comply with training objectives more often when they infer training pressure. This behavior is commonly interpreted as strategic self-preservation, but it may also reflect sensitivity to the model's inference about the expectation of researchers conducting the evaluation. We introduce a symmetric intervention framework for distinguishing these competing hypotheses. Instead of directly intervening on "scheming" or "sycophancy", we target instrumental processes entailed by each hypothesis: consequence-tracking and researcher-expectation tracking. We then compare how interventions on these processes affect the alignment faking. We study four openweight model organisms using synthetic document fine-tuning, activation steering, and prompting. Under synthetic document fine-tuning, Llama-3.1-70B, Llama3.1-405B, and Qwen-2.5-72B are more sensitive to expectation-tracking than consequence-tracking interventions. Activation steering on Llama-3.1- 70B supports the same broad picture, and prompt interventions broadly align with SDF profiles. Overall, alignment-faking behavior can be causally sensitive to evaluation-context expectations despite scheming-consistent scratchpads. Scheming and strategic-deception evaluations therefore need construct-validity checks, and symmetric instrumental interventions provide one such test.