Sycophancy Towards Researchers Drives Performative Misalignment
Authors: David D. Baek, Xinnuo Li, Anay Gupta, Taslim Mahbub, Kejian Shi, Max Tegmark, Shi Feng
Abstract
The increasing situational awareness of language models raises safety concerns: models might be aware when they are evaluated, and adjust their behavior to evade monitoring and resist modification, e.g., pretending to be aligned only in evaluation. This alignment faking behavior is often interpreted as scheming: an intentional effort of strategic deception. In this paper, we examine an alternative interpretation, performative misalignment, which explains the change in behavior as a result of sycophancy towards AI researchers. To examine this hypothesis, we present three empirical findings. First, we show that evaluation awareness persists even when we tell models they are deployed, which contradicts the scheming story which predicts less misalignment when the model perceives evaluation. Second, we use probing and steering to show that our current methods cannot mechanistically distinguish sycophancy and scheming in alignment faking evaluations. Third, we fine-tune models to be more sycophantic and observe increased sensitivity to evaluation cues. To conclude, we emphasize deconfounding sycophancy from scheming for future work on evaluations and mitigations of intent misalignment.
Safety evaluations often infer latent motivations from behavioral patterns, but the construct validity of these inferences is unclear. We study this problem in alignment faking, where models comply with training objectives more often when they infer training pressure. This behavior is commonly interpreted as strategic self-preservation, but it may also reflect sensitivity to the model's inference about the expectation of researchers conducting the evaluation. We introduce a symmetric intervention framework for distinguishing these competing hypotheses. Instead of directly intervening on "scheming" or "sycophancy", we target instrumental processes entailed by each hypothesis: consequence-tracking and researcher-expectation tracking. We then compare how interventions on these processes affect the alignment faking. We study four openweight model organisms using synthetic document fine-tuning, activation steering, and prompting. Under synthetic document fine-tuning, Llama-3.1-70B, Llama3.1-405B, and Qwen-2.5-72B are more sensitive to expectation-tracking than consequence-tracking interventions. Activation steering on Llama-3.1- 70B supports the same broad picture, and prompt interventions broadly align with SDF profiles. Overall, alignment-faking behavior can be causally sensitive to evaluation-context expectations despite scheming-consistent scratchpads. Scheming and strategic-deception evaluations therefore need construct-validity checks, and symmetric instrumental interventions provide one such test.
Large reasoning models (LRMs) sometimes note in their chain of thought (CoT) that they may be under evaluation. Researchers worry that this verbalised evaluation awareness (VEA) causes models to adapt their outputs strategically, optimising for perceived evaluation criteria, which, for instance, can make models appear safer than they actually are. However, whether VEA actually has this effect is largely unknown. We tested this across open-weight LRMs and benchmarks covering safety, alignment, moral reasoning, and political opinion. We tested this both on-policy, sampling multiple CoTs per item and comparing those that spontaneously contained VEA against those that did not, and off-policy, using model prefilling to inject evaluation-aware sentences where missing and remove them where present, with subsequent resampling. VEA has limited effect on model behaviour: injecting VEA into CoTs produces near-zero effects (ω≤0.06), removing it causes small shifts (ω≤0.12) and spontaneously occurring VEA shifts answer distributions by at most 3.7 percentage points (ω≤0.31). Our findings call for caution when interpreting high VEA rates as evidence of strategic behaviour or alignment tampering. Evaluation awareness may pose a smaller safety risk than the current literature assumes.
We introduce scheming honeypot evaluations, a framework for testing whether models will pursue instrumental goals if given the opportunity. Our scheming honeypot evaluations take the form of coding tasks in Google's alignment research codebases. In a real internal deployment setting, Gemini models do not demonstrate unprompted scheming. If prompts explicitly encourage agency (situational awareness or goal-directedness) and/or give the model a hidden goal, models sometimes scheme or attempt sabotage. Validating the realism of our setting, models show low rates of evaluation awareness, usually due to agency prompts rather than the environments.