Token Inflation: How Dishonest Providers Can Overcharge for Large Language Model Usage

We study a large language model (LLM) service in which a provider chooses a per-token price and a default reasoning-token allocation, while a user may accept the default, customize the allocation, or exit. Larger allocations can improve accuracy but increase token cost and latency. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and derive the user's unique optimal customized allocation in closed form. For any price, the acceptable defaults form either an empty set or a compact interval. We characterize the provider's optimal default through a three-regime rule, reduce equilibrium computation to a one-dimensional price optimization, and prove the existence of the equilibrium. We further show that defaults affect the implemented reasoning allocation only when users value the convenience of avoiding customization; otherwise, every service-providing outcome implements the user's optimal customized allocation. Experiments with two compact open-weight reasoning models on five mathematics and science benchmarks support the accuracy-token model and show how model and task characteristics determine equilibrium prices, defaults, and reasoning allocations.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly consumed through opaque serving chains - API aggregators, resellers, and inference providers - in which the client has no technical means to confirm that the model answering is the model advertised, and recent audits show that a substantial fraction of commercial endpoints deviate from the vendor's reference weights. Existing identification techniques require long generated texts, token-level log-probabilities, adversarially crafted prompts, or the model owner's cooperation. We show that far weaker evidence suffices. We define a behavioral fingerprint of an LLM as the empirical distribution of its answers to trivial one-word prompts - "name a random number between 1 and 100" - collected across four languages at a cost of one output token per query. Measuring 165 models served via a large commercial aggregator (OpenRouter), we find that (i) these distributions are highly non-uniform (median cell entropy 1.0 bit) and model-specific: split halves of the same model's samples lie an order of magnitude closer than samples of different models; (ii) Jensen-Shannon divergence between fingerprints recovers model lineage, assigning a model to its documented family with 59.5% leave-one-out accuracy against an 18.4% chance rate; and (iii) a biometric-style verification protocol achieves a 7.3% equal error rate with the full 40-cell battery, and below 11% with eight probe cells - roughly a hundred single-token queries per audit. We further report ecosystem anomalies, including a proprietary-branded flagship endpoint distributionally indistinguishable from an open-weight Qwen model. The protocol, prompts, raw data, and analysis code are released for reproduction and operational use.

LLM benchmarks can build an organization's reputation and attract customers, but only when results are transparent and verifiable. Unverified claims that DeepSeek R1 outperformed OpenAI's o1 contributed to market panic on January 27, 2025, when Nvidia lost USD589 billion in market value. Yet vendor benchmarks often depend on an honor system. Academic reassessments and independent leaderboards have found undisclosed changes to proprietary models, contaminated training data, and selective reporting. LLM-as-a-judge methods scale evaluation by reducing human review. Studies, however, suggest that judges may show identity-aware bias, scoring an answer according to its source model rather than its quality. This bias has not been fully measured or corrected across politically sensitive, reasoning-intensive, and preference-based tasks. We examine this problem using seven verifier models: GPT-OSS 120B, Llama 3.3 70B, GLM 5.1, Qwen3 32B, DeepSeek V4 Pro, Mistral Large3, and Sarvam M. They score anonymous and identity-disclosed responses from three primary models on 58 factual, reasoning, political, and preference-based questions. Identity disclosure slightly raises scores for factual questions, moderately affects stress-reasoning tasks, and causes large changes for geopolitically sensitive topics. Notable results include GLM5.1 (+7.00 points, p = 0.0249) and Llama 3.3 70B (+1.56 points, p = 0.00). We also introduce a blockchain-based commit-reveal protocol using Autonomous Economic Agents on an Ethereum-compatible ledger. In Phase 1, each judge records a one-way hash of its score and a secret salt before candidate identities are revealed. In Phase 2, the identity and raw score are disclosed and verified on-chain. This creates a tamper-evident audit trail that separates blind evaluation from post-hoc claims and reduces the verification burden on independent researchers and leaderboard operators.