Keep, Customize, or Exit: Default Design and Token Pricing in LLM Reasoning Services

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

Large language models (LLMs) provide strong reasoning capabilities but are expensive to serve at scale, whereas small language models (SLMs) are cheaper but less reliable on difficult problems. We introduce PyroDash, a cost-aware framework for token-level SLM-LLM collaborative inference. During generation, the SLM decides whether to request assistance by emitting a control token. A Collaborate Engine then sends the query and partial reasoning trace to a frozen LLM for completion through a single handoff. The policy is internalized in the SLM, requiring neither a separate router, LLM retraining, nor access to LLM logits. PyroDash trains the SLM in three stages: control-token embedding learning, offloading-oriented supervised fine-tuning, and cost-aware alignment with Group Relative Policy Optimization. Its reward balances answer accuracy against inference cost normalized by LLM-only inference. Across five mathematical reasoning benchmarks, PyroDash supports different accuracy-cost operating points. With $λ=0.05$, it achieves 64.04 percent average accuracy, 6.36 percentage points above the LLM-only baseline, while reducing cost by 20.4 percent. With $λ=0.6$, it achieves 54.55 percent accuracy with a 1.90 percent LLM token ratio and 0.012 LLM calls per example, reducing total cost from USD 49.36 to USD 1.78. These results show that learned token-level handoffs can reduce LLM use while preserving strong reasoning performance.

Per-token billing is now the standard pricing model for commercial large language models (LLMs), so the honesty of reported token counts directly affects what users pay. We show that this kind of billing is hard to audit by design: providers hide the model, the tokenizer, and the execution to protect their IP, mitigate jailbreaks, and preserve user privacy, which means an auditor can only inspect proofs the provider supplies. The audit therefore reduces to a consistency check on the provider's own reports. We call this a trust paradox: every audit must trust some artifact, but current frameworks trust exactly the ones a provider has the strongest reason to manipulate. We study three recent token auditing frameworks and show that a provider with ordinary commercial capabilities can systematically inflate billed token counts. In the most permissive setting, hidden reasoning usage can be inflated by 1,469% on average without detection. At current frontier reasoning prices, that turns a $100 honest bill into roughly a $1,569 bill on the same query. Even when the user can see the full reasoning string, tokenization ambiguity alone still allows 50.85% over-reporting below the detection threshold. These results suggest the problem is not in any specific auditor but in any audit whose evidence comes from the audited party. Restoring honest billing will require verification that ties reported token counts to evidence the provider does not control, such as trusted execution attestation, cryptographic proofs of inference, or third-party re-execution.