Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded $930$ five-second traces at $\sim 10$ MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of $97\%$ and a macro-averaged F1 score of $0.955$, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below $\sim 20$kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training $\geq 99\%$ of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected $48$--$88\%$ of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to $\geq 98\%$ with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

Computation integrity of remote large language model (LLM) serving can be questionable. For conventional deep neural networks (DNNs), the existing TEE-shielded DNN partitioning (TSDP) approach uses Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to compute non-linear components and verify the integrity of linear components offloaded to an untrusted GPU. However, directly applying TSDP to Transformer-based LLMs incurs significant TEE computation and TEE-GPU communication overhead. This paper presents Communication-efficient TEE-GPU Attention (\textsc{VeriAttn}) for accelerating verifiable LLM inference. \textsc{VeriAttn} offloads both linear and non-linear computations of attention to the GPU, while TEE performs verification. Moreover, for prefill, \textsc{VeriAttn} uses a two-level pipeline to overlap data movement, TEE pre-/post-processing, and GPU computation. For decoding, when the key-value cache exceeds available GPU memory, \textsc{VeriAttn} partitions attention across TEE and GPU to reduce repeated key-value transfers. Evaluation on an Intel TDX platform shows that \textsc{VeriAttn} achieves 2.60-3.38$\times$ and 3.86-5.42$\times$ acceleration over TSDP for 6k-token prompts and 10k-token outputs during prefill and decoding, respectively.

Open-source language models have a reproducibility problem. Despite releasing weights, training data, and recipes, none of them are provably reproducible due to the non-associativity of floating-point arithmetic. Deep learning frameworks often offer a deterministic execution mode, allowing reproducible operations on the same machines. Unfortunately, this determinism does not carry across hardware such that a user can verify that a released checkpoint was actually produced using the declared training recipe. This leaves room for undisclosed data, injected biases, or backdoors that existing techniques such as proof-of-learning or proof-of-training-data cannot rule out. We introduce a new tier of model transparency, fully auditable, in which every operation on every data sample during training is independently reproducible on heterogeneous commodity hardware with bitwise certainty. By imposing a definite order on the sources of training nondeterminism, GPU kernel reductions, data batch ordering across a data-parallel cluster, and inter/intra-node collective communication, we make it possible to replay any individual step of a large, distributed training run on a single piece of commodity hardware and check it against the published trajectory. Because replaying an entire run on one machine is infeasible, we support this with a collective verification scheme in which many independent auditors each certify individual steps, together covering the whole run. We release Open-1B, a model trained under this regime, together with its full pretraining dataset, every intermediate checkpoint, the training codebase, and the audit harness needed to reproduce and verify any step of its training.