Reinforcement Learning with Pairwise Preferences in Long-Term Decision Problems

Preference-conditioned multi-objective reinforcement learning aims to learn a single policy that captures trade-offs across preferences, but under nonlinear scalarization the uniqueness and continuity of the preference-to-solution correspondence remain unclear. We study this problem in tabular multi-objective Markov decision processes (MDPs) using smooth Tchebycheff scalarization as a monotone utility. Under mild interior conditions on the preference set, we prove that each preference induces a unique Pareto-optimal return vector and that this vector depends Lipschitz-continuously on the preference, providing a principled foundation for preference sweeping toward dense Pareto-front coverage. To compute these targets, we formulate the problem over occupancy measures and derive Concave Mirror Descent Policy Iteration (CMDPI), which achieves an $O(1/k)$ objective-suboptimality rate. We further show that each update is equivalent to solving a Kullback-Leibler-regularized MDP with the previous policy as reference, yielding a policy-iteration interpretation and finite-iterate policy continuity across preferences. We instantiate the update as a deep actor-critic algorithm preserving previous-policy regularization. On eight MO-Gymnasium tasks, it achieves the best average hypervolume rank among recent baselines and strong expected-utility performance. Continuous-control experiments indicate gains beyond the discrete-action setting.

Human feedback often arrives as preferences rather than calibrated numeric rewards, motivating reinforcement learning from preferential feedback, also referred to as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We present a rigorous theoretical study of preference-only learning in episodic kernel MDPs. In each episode, the learner deploys two policies from a common start state and receives a single binary label indicating which trajectory is preferred, modeled by a Bradley--Terry--Luce link on the difference of cumulative (unobserved) rewards. Under kernel-based assumptions on the reward and transition functions (one of the most general models amenable to theoretical analysis) we develop preference-based value estimation and confidence sets tailored to end-of-episode comparisons. We prove high-probability regret bounds that scale sublinearly in the number of episodes, implying that the value of the learned policy converges to that of the optimal policy.

Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation. Existing matching models typically reduce this process to immediate sub-Gaussian feedback about fixed preferences, missing settings where payoff-relevant information is revealed gradually and changes future matching decisions. We introduce a framework with temporally extended feedback, that formulates two-sided matching as a partially observable Markov game with costly pre-match screening, noisy post-match observations, evolving latent profiles, and endogenous continuation or dissolution. We instantiate this framework in Learn2Match, a multi-agent reinforcement-learning benchmark for dynamic matching markets. Learn2Match supports decentralized decision making over whom to interview, whom to match with, and when to dissolve a match, while evaluating policies using regret, social welfare, and an information-friction loss that measures the welfare gap caused by incomplete revelation of latent preferences. We find that independent PPO achieves higher cumulative social welfare and lower cumulative regret than the bandit-style CA-ETC baseline under temporally extended feedback, demonstrating the promise of MARL for dynamic matching markets. However, PPO still incurs higher information-friction loss, revealing that end-to-end MARL does not yet provide the coordinated exploration structure of matching-bandit methods. These results position Learn2Match as a benchmark for developing the next generation of matching-market algorithms: methods that are adaptive like RL agents, statistically disciplined like bandit algorithms, and structurally aware like stable-matching mechanisms. Please refer to https://sites.google.com/view/learn-to-match/home for the official website and the code link.