Margin Play: A Multi-Agent System For Public Policy Analysis In The Brazilian Equatorial Margin

Multi-agent simulations are widely used to study complex social and ecological systems, where rich and often unexpected emergent behaviors arise from local interactions. A large body of prior work has focused on analyzing such emergent dynamics across domains. In this paper, we move beyond analyzing emergent behavior and introduce a learning-based mechanism for actively shaping it via social reward modeling. We introduce Multi-Agent Reward Prediction (MARP), a simple framework that extends preference-based reward modeling to multi-agent reinforcement learning. While the framework is designed to be applicable across multi-agent settings, the present empirical validation is limited to a single environment, and we therefore present MARP as a proof of concept within the studied domain. Rather than relying on handcrafted rewards, MARP learns a shared reward model from episode-level evaluations of collective outcomes, enabling decentralized agents to align their behavior with global social objectives. We study MARP in the Harvest Game, a canonical sequential social dilemma modeling common-pool resource management and related real-world challenges. Our results show that MARP can be tuned to produce behavior that is more closely aligned with target social metrics than standard reward-based baselines, while the learned reward model captures subtle environmental structure without explicit programming. Crucially, MARP supports multiple and composite social objectives within a single training regime. By modifying only the high-level evaluation metric, the same framework seamlessly aligns agent behavior with diverse goals, including sustainability, equality, and peace, as well as combinations of individual and group-level objectives. These findings demonstrate that emergent multi-agent behavior can be treated not only as a phenomenon to study, but as a target of principled, data-driven regulation.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) requires agents to discover joint strategies in a combinatorially large state-action space, yet effective coordination configurations are exceedingly rare. Intrinsic motivation, which augments task rewards with novelty bonuses, is a popular approach for driving exploration, but its effectiveness hinges on the exploration intensity $β$, where too large a value overwhelms the task signal and causes coordination collapse, while too small a value prevents discovery of rare strategies. We address two complementary challenges: adapting $β$ globally over training, and allocating the exploration budget across agents whose intrinsic reward signals vary in reliability. Our framework combines a return-conditioned sigmoid schedule (RCB) for global intensity control with a per-agent Reward Signal Quality (RSQ) metric that concentrates the exploration budget on agents with reliable signals. The core insight is that agents receiving noisy intrinsic rewards should explore less aggressively, and this allocation can be determined automatically from signal-to-noise statistics. Successor Distance (SD), a quasimetric intrinsic reward, naturally produces distinguishable per-agent signal quality, completing the framework with convergence and ordering preservation guarantees. On seven cooperative benchmarks (MPE, SMAX, MABrax), our method achieves top-tier returns across all environments.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.