Position: Prioritize Identifying Structure, Not Complex Models, for Scientific Discovery

Recent advances in foundation models have transformed AI for Science, enabling remarkably accurate predictive performance across domains ranging from protein folding to weather forecasting. Yet prediction alone does not constitute scientific discovery. Scientific understanding depends on uncovering the reusable explanatory mechanisms that generate observations, whereas contemporary machine learning remains fundamentally organised around predictive mappings rather than explanatory structure. In this paper, we argue that scientific discovery is fundamentally a problem of knowledge organisation. To this end, we introduce Mechanistic World Models, a new design paradigm that places reusable mechanisms at the centre of representation, computation and learning. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of science, we derive the computational capabilities required for discovery, identify the design principles and inductive pressures that encourage explanatory knowledge to emerge, and formalise the anatomy of a mechanism-centric world model. Finally, we show how diverse research directions including mechanistic interpretability, causal representation learning, equation discovery and modular architectures capture complementary ingredients of this paradigm while lacking a unified framework. We propose Mechanistic World Models as a conceptual foundation and computational blueprint for moving AI beyond predictive forecasting towards autonomous scientific discovery.

Modern artificial intelligence excels at prediction but cannot explain. From large language models to AI-for-science systems, today's machines answer what by recombining patterns already present in the human literature, yet they cannot reason out why a phenomenon must arise from underlying principles even though explanation, not prediction, lies at the heart of scientific discovery. Here we ask whether the structure of scientific explanation can be operationalized to guide how a machine generates hypotheses. We introduce DN-Hypo-Pipeline, a hypothesis-generation framework that adopts a layered, explanation-theoretic scaffold: Hempel's deductive-nomological (DN) model supplies the output form and deductive validity of a hypothesis, Salmon's causal-process account supplies an organizing constraint on where to search for the governing laws, and Armstrong's view of laws as relations between universals supplies the bridge from a phenomenon's constituent processes to the laws that may be associated with it. Rather than searching the space of what has been written, the framework searches the space of what principles govern a phenomenon: given an explanandum, it abstracts the universals instantiated in the phenomenon's formation process, retrieves the laws relating those universals, and deductively reconstructs a new, testable explanation. Evaluated in data-science modeling and judged by both LLMs and human experts, hypotheses generated through this principled reasoning significantly outperform those from direct prompting. Crucially, we translated the two highest-scoring hypotheses into novel algorithms one that reduces the Transformer's theoretical complexity with only minimal performance loss, and another that achieves competitive accuracy with substantially fewer parameters.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.