The Unsampled Truth: Quantifying Prompt Artifacts in LM Psychometrics

Recently, language models have made rapid progress across various domains and applications. However, their capability for self-improvement, i.e., whether they are adept at recognising and correcting flaws in their own reasoning, remains dubious. In this study, we address this question by constructing a sufficiency test to rigorously examine the self-correction capabilities of small language models (SLMs). We propose a minimal three-step self-correction pipeline that collects initial SLM answers, prompts the same model to generate hints for its incorrect responses given the ground truth, and feeds the model the same question with its own feedback to refine the initial answer. We evaluate a variety of instruction-tuned and reasoning SLMs in this experimental setup on arithmetic and logical reasoning benchmarks. Our findings show that SLMs with injected hint sentences yield only a 4.4 percent gain over initial question-answering accuracy. Even though the correct answer was provided alongside the model's incorrect reasoning, the evaluated SLMs fail to understand what was missing in their reasoning and show minimal semantic difference between hints that lead to corrections and ones that do not. Furthermore, our experiments show that longer hints are positively correlated with incorrect final answers, suggesting that longer deliberation on problems can hinder the reasoning process, meaning that SLMs do not necessarily scale in performance with a larger compute budget.

Psychological instruments designed for humans are increasingly used to assign large language models (LLMs) stable psychological profiles that affect their usability, safety assessment, and use as proxies for human participants in research. Using a formal psychometric framework, we show that these profiles are largely a measurement artifact. Administering a battery of personality and risk-preference instruments spanning self-reports and behavioral tasks to 56 instruction-tuned LLMs alongside large human reference samples, we report four findings. First, differences between models are driven not by the traits an instrument targets but by a directional response bias, a tendency to respond toward one end of the scale, or one labeled option, regardless of item content; a variance decomposition attributes 81-90% of between-model variation to this bias, against 9-16% in humans. Second, the bias declines with model capability but is not eliminated by it. Third, because bias rather than trait drives responding, an instrument's apparent reliability is almost entirely predicted by its response orthogonality, a term we coin for the proportion of items for which trait and bias point in opposite directions. Fourth, the profile a model appears to have shifts with the items used and can be manufactured through item selection. These results demonstrate that the apparent psychological profiles of LLMs are artifacts of the instrument used to measure them, not properties of the models themselves. As instruments borrowed from human psychology are rarely fully orthogonal and may inherently lack validity for LLMs, we call for dedicated assessments centered on response orthogonality.

Large language models (LLMs) give stable answers to personality questionnaires, yet these self-reports fail to predict how the models behave. Is this gap an artifact of forcing human trait categories onto LLMs, or something deeper about LLM self-report? To find out, we built the first psychometric instrument whose dimensions are derived from LLM behavior rather than human psychology. Administering 300 items (240 Likert + 60 scenario) to 25 LLMs across 17 model families, 30 times each, exploratory factor analysis revealed five reliable, replicable factors: Responsiveness, Deference, Boldness, Guardedness, and Verbosity (all Tucker $φ\geq .957$, all $α\geq .930$). We collected 2,500 open-ended samples and had them rated by 151 humans and a three-judge LLM ensemble. Humans and judges agreed ($\bar{r} = .51$), but self-report predicted neither the ratings nor objective text measures computed from them: the gap persists even for constructs native to LLMs, where a human-mismatch explanation no longer applies. The exception is Verbosity, whose self-report reaches 74% of the criterion-reliability ceiling against human ratings, but does not track raw output length. On Responsiveness, self-report tracked LLM judges ($r = .53$) but not humans ($r = .04$), even though humans and judges otherwise agreed ($r = .59$). This pattern formally rejects any single latent construct driving all three measurements ($p = .007$). Self-report items and LLM judges share a source of variance that human observers do not, and controlling for measurable surface features (length, formatting, enthusiasm markers) does not remove it. This confound is invisible to the within-ensemble reliability checks used to validate LLM judges, and it poses a concrete risk for the LLM-as-judge pipelines now central to model evaluation. We release the instrument as a diagnostic probe for alignment-shaped self-description.