MimeLens: Position-Agnostic Content-Type Detection for Binary Fragments

Malware analysis starts with the raw bytes of an executable program, and tools to "lift" these to higher-level representations, such as assembly, are expensive and subject to error. Large Language Models (LLMs) cannot process raw byte representations and answer questions about them. To this end, we present the first byte-native LLM. Based on a vocabulary expansion technique using a bespoke byte tokenizer, such a model is capable of responding to complex questions about malware binaries, with accuracies ranging from 69% for malware family classification to 98% for architecture classification. Our findings indicate that providing domain knowledge during training is essential for this application -- off-the-shelf models lack both accuracy and insight. We've deployed this emerging solution to a limited number of analysts to gather feedback for further improvements.

As LLM-generated content becomes more sophisticated, detection systems for distinguishing those texts from human-written text must operate at scale while handling diverse writing styles, domains, languages, and generator models. Input-only encoder detectors are suitable for practical deployment setting, but standard binary classification supplies only the class label and does not explicitly organize the substantial variation within either class. We propose MD-ProTector, which represents each class with multiple trainable reference vectors in the encoder embedding space, referred to as prototypes. These prototypes provide separate decision boundaries for different groups of texts within the same class. However, adding multiple prototypes alone does not determine which variation each prototype should represent. MD-ProTector addresses this problem with Prototype Positioning loss, which separates class-level structure from the within-class variation that differentiates individual prototypes. Evaluated across five settings from three large-scale benchmarks covering domain, generator, language, and adversarial variation, MD-ProTector achieves the highest AvgRec on MAGE CDCM and RAID and the highest AUROC and lowest FPR95 on RAID among the compared encoder-based methods.

Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) can assist this process by classifying decompiled code as benign or malicious, but existing pipelines typically rely on a single decompiler view. We argue that this assumption is fragile: decompilers are lossy heuristic tools, and different decompilers can expose different artefacts of the same binary. We curate a benchmark of benign utilities and malicious programs spanning a range of threat behaviors. Each sample is compiled and decompiled with both Ghidra and RetDec, yielding matched pseudo-C views. Across a range of LLMs from major model families, we find that providing both decompiler views improves malicious-class F1, mainly by increasing recall on malicious samples. Agreement analyses further show that Ghidra and RetDec make partially different errors, supporting the view that decompiler outputs provide complementary evidence. Our results suggest that multi-decompiler prompting is a simple, training-free way to improve LLM-based malware triage in practical settings.