Organizations: Department of Linguistics, Stanford University · BIO-X Interdisciplinary Biosciences Institute, Stanford University · Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
A sentence like "The authors that no critics recommended have ever received acknowledgment for a best-selling novel" is sometimes rated as acceptable even though, strictly speaking, it is ungrammatical because the negative polarity word "ever" is not licensed where it is. This behavioral effect is sometimes called a "negative polarity illusion". Here we propose that the lossy context surprisal theory of Hahn et al. (2022) -- whereby people have an imperfect encoding of complex sentences -- might explain this effect. We hypothesize that people have poor memory representation of the determiners in the main-clause and embedded-clause subjects and could entertain a determiner exchange that licenses ever. We propose that more similar determiners in those positions would trigger stronger illusion effects. Acceptability judgment tasks with six novel determiner pairs (e.g., "few" and "many", "few" and "most") support our proposal, showing, specifically, that a novel sentence, "Many authors that few critics recommended have ever received acknowledgment for a best-selling novel", triggered a much stronger illusion than the canonical one even without time pressure. These results offer further support for the suggestion that human language processing is imperfect and resource-rational: in face of working memory limitations, humans rationally reconstruct what is most likely from noisy linguistic input to facilitate downstream processing.
Like visual processing, language processing is susceptible to illusions in which people systematically misperceive stimuli. In one such case--the comparative illusion (CI), e.g., More students have been to Russia than I have--comprehenders tend to judge the sentence as acceptable despite its underlying nonsensical comparison. Prior research has argued that this phenomenon can be explained as Bayesian inference over a noisy channel: the posterior probability of an interpretation of a sentence is proportional to both the prior probability of that interpretation and the likelihood of corruption into the observed (CI) sentence. Initial behavioral work has supported this claim by evaluating a narrow set of alternative interpretations of CI sentences and showing that comprehenders favor interpretations that are more likely to have been corrupted into the illusory sentence. In this study, we replicate and go substantially beyond this earlier work by directly predicting the strength of illusion with a quantitative model of the posterior probability of plausible interpretations, which we derive through a novel synthesis of statistical language models with human behavioral data. Our model explains not only the fine gradations in the strength of CI effects, but also a previously unexplained effect caused by pronominal vs. full noun phrase than-clause subjects. These findings support a noisy-channel theory of sentence comprehension by demonstrating that the theory makes novel predictions about the comparative illusion that bear out empirically. This outcome joins related evidence of noisy channel processing in both illusory and non-illusory contexts to support noisy channel inference as a unified computational-level theory of diverse language processing phenomena.
Surprisal theory hypothesizes that the difficulty of human sentence processing increases linearly with surprisal, the negative log-probability of a word given its context. Computational psycholinguistics has tested this hypothesis using language models (LMs) as proxies for human prediction. While surprisal derived from recent neural LMs generally captures human processing difficulty on naturalistic corpora that predominantly consist of simple sentences, it severely underestimates processing difficulty on sentences that require syntactic disambiguation (garden-path effects). This leads to the claim that the processing difficulty of such sentences cannot be reduced to surprisal, although it remains possible that neural LMs simply differ from humans in next-word prediction. In this paper, we investigate whether it is truly impossible to construct a neural LM that can explain garden-path effects via surprisal. Specifically, instead of evaluating off-the-shelf neural LMs, we fine-tune these LMs on garden-path sentences so as to better align surprisal-based reading-time estimates with actual human reading times. Our results show that fine-tuned LMs do not overfit and successfully capture human reading slowdowns on held-out garden-path items; they even improve predictive power for human reading times on naturalistic corpora and preserve their general LM capabilities. These results provide an existence proof for a neural LM that can explain both garden-path effects and naturalistic reading times via surprisal, but also raise a theoretical question: what kind of evidence can truly falsify surprisal theory?
Large language models are routinely used as automated evaluators: to review code, moderate content, or score outputs, often with many items passing through one conversation. We ask whether the polarity of prior conversation history biases subsequent judgments, an effect we call the accumulated message effect on LLM judgments (AMEL). Across 84,088 API calls to 12 models from 5 providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, DeepSeek, and four open-source models), we present identical test items in isolation or following histories saturated with predominantly positive or negative evaluations. Models shift toward the conversation's prevailing polarity (d = -0.17, p < 10^-53). The effect concentrates on items where the model is genuinely uncertain at baseline (d = -0.36 for high-entropy items, vs d = -0.15 when the baseline is deterministic). Bias does not grow with context length: 5 prior turns and 50 produce the same shift (Spearman |r| < 0.01; OLS slope p = 0.80). And there is a negativity asymmetry: paired per item, negative histories induce 1.52x more bias than positive (t = 13.03, p < 10^-36, n = 2,733). Scaling helps but does not solve it (Anthropic: Haiku -0.22 to Opus -0.17; OpenAI: Nano -0.34 to GPT-5.2 -0.17). Three follow-ups narrow the mechanism. The token probability distribution shifts continuously, not at a threshold. The negativity asymmetry has both token-level and semantic components, though attributing the balance is exploratory at our sample sizes. Position does not matter: five biased turns anywhere in a 50-turn history produce the same shift. The simplest fix for evaluation pipelines is a fresh context per item; when batching is unavoidable, balancing the history helps.