cs.CRJun 4, 2026

AttackPathGNN: Cross-function vulnerability detection in smart contracts using state interference graphs and conjunction pooling

Authors: Gabriela DobritaSimona-Vasilica OpreaAdela Bara

Organizations: Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Department of Economic Informatics and Cybernetics, no.6 Piața Romană, Bucharest, 010374, Romania

Abstract

Existing learning-based detectors for Solidity smart-contracts reduce vulnerability detection to syntactic pattern matching within single functions, yet many of the most consequential exploits (The DAO, Cream Finance) exist not in any individual function but in the relationship between functions and in the combination of conditions that made the attack feasible. Thus, we propose AttackPathGNN, a graph neural network (GNN) that reframes detection as reasoning over explicit attack paths. Two architectural choices distinguish it from prior GNN-based detectors: (1)a State Interference Graph that links every pair of functions sharing mutable storage through typed, weighted edges and through directed reentrancy-path edges defined by an explicit five-condition predicate; (2)conjunction pooling, a differentiable AND-aggregator over eight named exploit preconditions whose log-sigmoid form causes the per-function exploit score to collapse whenever any single mitigation (a reentrancy guard, an access-control modifier or SafeMath) is in place. Across five independent training runs, AttackPathGNN attains 92.3+/-0.2% F1 on the SmartBugs Wild held-out test partition (4.3+/-0.3% false-negative rate, 90.8+/-2.5% detection rate on the independently human-labelled SmartBugs Curated benchmark), recovering 6/10 DASP10 categories at 100% on every seed and Reentrancy at 98.7+/-1.8%. Each prediction is emitted with a structured remediation report, turning each verdict into an actionable, function-level audit finding.

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