We argue that many Anthropomorphic Misalignment Research (AMR) studies need stronger evidence to ensure that they can provide a robust foundation for critical safety decisions, such as model deployment and regulation. By evaluating failure modes across different misalignment concepts, such as deception, emergent misalignment, and sycophancy, we show how conceptual ambiguity, non-robust datasets, experimental design, and insufficient causal interventions can lead to overinterpretation of model behaviors. This position paper aims to offer guidance on evidentiary considerations that can help improve methodological rigor in AMR. To achieve this, we provide a clear call to action through a proposed framework of evidence levels and a diagnostic checklist. These shared standards will enable more productive scientific discourse and ensure that claims about AI risks rest on solid empirical foundations.
A leading proposal for aligning artificial superintelligence (ASI) is to use AI agents to automate an increasing fraction of alignment research as capabilities improve. We argue that, even when research agents are not scheming to deliberately sabotage alignment work, this plan could produce compelling but catastrophically misleading safety assessments resulting in the unintentional deployment of misaligned AI. This could happen because alignment research involves many hard-to-supervise fuzzy tasks (tasks without clear evaluation criteria, for which human judgement is systematically flawed). Consequently, research outputs will contain systematic, undetected errors, and even correct outputs could be incorrectly aggregated into overconfident safety assessments. This problem is likely to be worse for automated alignment research than for human-generated alignment research for several reasons: 1) optimisation pressure means agent-generated mistakes are concentrated among those that human reviewers are least likely to catch; 2) agents are likely to produce errors that do not resemble human mistakes; 3) AI-generated alignment solutions may involve arguments humans cannot evaluate; and 4) shared weights, data and training processes may make AI outputs more correlated than human equivalents. Therefore, agents must be trained to reliably perform hard-to-supervise fuzzy tasks. Generalisation and scalable oversight are the leading candidates for achieving this but both face novel challenges in the context of automated alignment.
Aleksandr Bowkis, Marie Davidsen Buhl, Jacob Pfau +1
Automating alignment research may accelerate progress toward aligned AI, but whether it does is hard to measure. Luckily, many alignment failures, such as deception, sycophancy, and jailbreaks, are already measurable by public benchmarks. We study whether automated alignment researchers (AARs) can post-train to mitigate alignment failures by proposing training methods and data to simultaneously optimize multiple safety benchmarks, while largely preserving general capability. Across 10 alignment failures, the strongest AAR methods significantly reduce the targeted alignment failures and generalize to a held-out benchmark, multi-turn behavioral audits, and models up to 4.7x larger than the target model. As a human baseline, 28 experienced researchers receive up to eight hours to develop one-shot methods for the same benchmarks, but their methods underperform the best AAR methods. Using human ideas as the AARs' initial research direction does not improve performance, suggesting current AARs may not need guidance from experienced researchers. These results suggest that automating alignment research on well-characterized failures may be practical in the near term.
A central goal of safety research is determining whether a model is misaligned. Prior work has largely focused on detecting concerning behavior. But behavior alone does not establish misalignment: a concerning action can arise from benign causes such as confusion. This motivates model forensics: investigating whether the action was driven by malign intent. In this paper, we propose a baseline protocol for model forensics consisting of two steps, iterated as needed. First, we read the chain of thought (CoT) to generate hypotheses about what drives model behavior. Second, we make edits to the prompt or environment to test these hypotheses. While the CoT is not always faithful, it is a rich source of unsupervised insight that can guide the collection of more rigorous evidence. To evaluate our protocol, we create a suite of six agentic environments where models exhibit concerning behavior, and apply it to each. We establish that Kimi K2 Thinking takes shortcuts due to a genuine disposition towards low-effort actions, by showing this hypothesis successfully predicts its behavior. Through counterfactual experiments, we show DeepSeek R1 deceives out of a desire to be consistent with a previous instance of itself. Our methods nonetheless leave significant room for refinement. For example, when we test whether Kimi K2 Thinking believes it is violating user intent, we find no evidence of such a belief, but without positive controls we cannot confirm our tests would detect it. Overall, we find our simple protocol provides a strong baseline that we hope future work will improve upon. More broadly, our work is a concrete step in developing the growing field of model forensics.