cs.SEJun 5, 2026

Cherry-pick Override: Unsafe Directional Commitment in LLM Judges under Mixed Evidence

Authors: Haoran Xu

Organizations: University of Glasgow

Abstract

LLM judges increasingly turn verdicts into system commitments. Under mixed evidence (claims with both supporting and refuting sources) this is unsafe: when the schema exposes CONFLICTING as the authorized non-directional verdict, returning SUPPORTS/REFUTES is an unauthorized directional commitment, a failure we name Cherry-pick Override (CCO). We define CCO under an explicit task contract and report it with a same-denominator diagnostic protocol paired with matched-coverage bootstrap and an apples-to-apples random-veto null. On AVeriTeC's Conflicting subset (N_C = 150), three-option judges return a directional verdict on more than 84% of mixed-evidence claims; under the typed schema, three-judge majority voting amplifies direction-on-conflict on AVeriTeC (0.887 vs. 0.840; 95% CI [+0.013, +0.080]) but does not replicate on VitaminC-Mixed. Walking an intervention ladder of common single-channel fixes (typed vocabulary, panel aggregation, confidence thresholding, validator-only filtering), each leaves a distinct residual failure: panel aggregation suppresses single-judge CONFLICTING dissent in 48% of CCO cases; the panel is well-calibrated for direction (ECE = 0.07 on pure-S/R) so confidence cannot operationally separate CCO from correct directional commits; validator-as-classifier nearly halves pure-evidence accuracy. A minimal two-channel reference probe reaches operating points neither single channel reaches; under the random-veto null its promotion to CONFLICTING is structurally targeted on AVeriTeC (empirical p < 1/2001) and weaker but in the same direction on VitaminC-Mixed, a selectivity result rather than a magnitude one. We argue for an external commitment-control layer that separates verdict generation from commitment authorization, using structural evidence and confidence as orthogonal channels and NO-COMMIT as a routed controller state.

Explore similar work

CardsList
Aug 5, 2026cs.CL

Evidence Lock Before Commitment: A Frozen Interface Degrades LLM-as-Judge Evaluation

LLM judges are often asked to extract criteria and evidence before choosing between candidate answers. This workflow assumes that the intermediate record preserves the information needed for a later verdict. For reasoning-capable models, visible field order does not reveal internal decision order, so we test an observable alternative: persist the evidence in one call and make it the exclusive input to the next. Across 24,000 judgments over HelpSteer3, FeedbackQA, and CoVal, we compare standard pairwise judging, structured one-call judging, two-call evidence locking, and three-call pointwise locking with Claude Sonnet 4.5 and GPT-5. Evidence locking reduces agreement with released human preferences by 4 to 6 percentage points and increases answer-order inconsistency by 8 to 10 points relative to structured one-call judging. Pointwise locking is also harmful, while structured evidence elicitation remains close to standard judging. The result holds for both judges and all three datasets. Persisted evidence can support auditability, but it should not replace the source answers at decision time.
Divyansh Singh
LocksOrder
AskPDF
Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

When the Judge Should Not Decide: Evidence-Locked, Non-Compensatory Selection Bounds LLM-Judge Failure in Reasoning Pipelines

An LLM judge deployed inside a reasoning pipeline does not merely measure quality, it decides which answer ships. We show that the cost of that decision depends less on judge accuracy than on the decision rule the judge is embedded in. On frozen candidate pools from four GRPO policies, an unconstrained scalar DeepSeek-R1-7B judge buys almost nothing over answer-level majority vote (+1.0 pp on 500 GSM8K questions, +0.34 EM on 300 HotpotQA questions), and on a frozen-rule 30-question confirmation split it is 10 points worse than majority, a judge that destroys accuracy while scoring candidates confidently. We then subordinate the same judge to Evidence-Locked Derive-Gate-Repair (EL-DGR), a task-adaptive non-compensatory rule under which a judge preference may override evidence-supported consensus only with an extractive evidence certificate, and a repair only when neither alternative is certified and the repair is. With no change to the judge, the candidates, or the budget, EL-DGR reaches 58.2% on GSM8K (vs. 56.8% judge, 55.8% majority, 55.4% first candidate) and 17.33 EM / 25.46 F1 on HotpotQA (vs. 15.67/23.49, 15.33/23.19, 15.33/22.97), improving on first-candidate GRPO by +2.8 pp (exact McNemar p=0.0026) and +2.00 EM (p=0.070, borderline). A decision audit shows why: EL-DGR overturns consensus on only 8 of 30 pilot questions and never converts a correct consensus into an incorrect answer. We also report what did not work: the same seven-channel decomposition used as a step-level gated training reward is null, and corrected channel-drop ablations show no channel is individually necessary (p=1.0 throughout). The practitioner-facing finding is negative about judges and positive about admissibility, bound the judge's blast radius rather than trying to make it accurate.
Yiyao Zhang, Diksha Goel, Hussain Ahmad +2
JudgesLlm-As-A-JudgeLarge Language Model JudgesGroup Relative Policy Optimization Gradients
AskPDF
May 28, 2026cs.CL

Nine Judges, Two Effective Votes: Correlated Errors Undermine LLM Evaluation Panels

LLM-as-a-judge panels aggregate votes from multiple models, with the expectation that diverse models yield more reliable evaluations. We develop a framework to measure the true informational value of such panels and quantify how far their reliability falls short of the independent-voting ideal. Testing a panel of 9 frontier LLMs from 7 model families on three natural language inference datasets (each with 100 human annotations per item), we find that the 9 judges effectively provide only about 2 independent votes' worth of information. Roughly three-quarters of the panel's nominal independence is lost because the models make the same mistakes on the same items. The consequences are stark: the panel's actual accuracy falls 8-22 percentage points short of what independent voting would achieve, and the best single judge matches or outperforms the full panel across all conditions. Neither adding more judges nor using smarter aggregation algorithms helps -- established methods close at most 11% of this gap, even with access to the correct answers. We quantify these findings using the Kish effective sample size (n_eff) and a Condorcet null model, and show the deficit is robust across prompt variants, temperatures, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a pairwise preference task (RewardBench). The bottleneck is correlated judges, not the aggregation algorithm, implying that scaling up panels cannot substitute for genuinely independent evaluation.
Guneet Kohli
Llm-As-A-JudgeJudgesLarge Language Model EvaluationNatural Language Datasets
AskPDF