cs.CLJun 8, 2026

When Built-in Thinking Helps and Hurts: Constraint-Level Error Shifts in Instruction Following

Authors: Sai Adith Senthil Kumar

Organizations: George Mason University

Abstract

Large reasoning models (LRMs) often improve math and coding performance, but their effect on instruction following is unclear. We study IFEval with Qwen3 models (1.7B-32B), using same-weights Thinking ON/OFF controls; four Hunyuan models provide directional cross-family support. Aggregate pass-rate changes are small (-0.55 to -3.52 pp), yet 10-20% of prompts switch between pass and fail across modes, suggesting that thinking changes the pattern of errors--some prompts improve while others worsen--rather than uniformly degrading performance. Under a post-hoc Qwen3-derived grouping, constraint types separate into Planning (global counting, structure, coordination), which improves at the class level under thinking, and Precision (exact local form), which consistently worsens; the class-level Planning/Precision sign pattern holds directionally for all four Hunyuan models despite Hunyuan's opposite aggregate direction. Thinking also changes final-answer length; matched-length analyses substantially reduce the Precision drop, but a residual penalty remains. Analyzing thinking traces with a cross-encoder relevance metric reveals three patterns: Neutral shows a positive relevance-compliance link (r approximately 0.15); Planning shows near-zero predictive correlation (r approximately 0.02) despite measurable trace engagement, consistent with an execution gap between CE-measured trace relevance and final-answer compliance; Precision shows a small negative correlation (r approximately -0.05), with failing instances having higher mean relevance than passing ones. Activation patching across four model sizes (1.7B-14B) shows that Precision flip instances are more often restored than Planning flip instances (32-58% vs. 14-40% mean layer-restoration), with the largest gap at 14B (about 30 pp).

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