Runtime Enforcement of Hybrid System Properties

Hybrid dynamical systems provide a powerful modeling framework for robotic systems, particularly in contact-rich environments. However, ensuring safety and performance in such systems remains challenging due to the intricate coupling between continuous dynamics and discrete mode transitions. In this work, we extend classical Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) reachability analysis, a formal verification method for continuous-time nonlinear systems, to hybrid dynamical systems. Our framework characterizes safe sets for hybrid systems through a generalized value function defined over both discrete and continuous states while accounting for control constraints and model uncertainty. We additionally provide a numerical algorithm to compute this value function. Building on these safe sets, we propose two different mechanisms to integrate performance objectives. First, we introduce a hybrid least-restrictive safety filter that intervenes on both the discrete and continuous components of a nominal controller only when necessary to avoid unsafe states, thereby preserving nominal behavior whenever possible. Second, we formulate and compute hybrid backward reach-avoid tubes, enabling the simultaneous enforcement of safety and goal-reaching behavior, an extension not previously addressed within hybrid HJ reachability. This enables the synthesis of continuous and discrete control policies that guarantee both safety and task completion. We validate our framework through simulation studies and real-world experiments on a quadrupedal robot, demonstrating its effectiveness in hybrid mode planning and safety-critical applications.

This paper studies runtime safety for autonomous driving when high-level driving commands become faulty or unreliable. Unlike conventional runtime-safety approaches that mainly focus on immediate vehicle safety, the proposed framework evaluates both driving safety and whether the vehicle can still successfully complete its mission before a command is executed. The framework extends highway-env with mission-level fault scenarios such as skipping required checkpoints, entering restricted areas, and generating future routes that can no longer complete the mission successfully. A runtime monitoring system is introduced to detect and reject unsafe or mission-infeasible commands before execution. For comparison, an adapted Simplex-Drive runtime-safety baseline with learning-based driving control, safety fallback control, and runtime controller switching is implemented using the public Simplex-Drive framework. Experimental results show that platform-level runtime safety alone cannot detect mission-level planning faults, while the proposed framework successfully rejects mission-infeasible commands and improves mission success under randomized fault conditions.

Autonomous agents, whether LLM-driven software agents or robotic physical agents, face a common class of failure modes when operating without continuous human oversight: safety violations from unverified actions, behavioral instability from unconstrained loops, and continuity loss from unhandled error states. We develop \system{}, a discrete-time control system that combines five execution gears (\Gobs{}, \Gsug{}, \Gplan{}, \Gexec{}, \Gint{}) with utility-gated dispatch and event-driven fallback. For the single-agent case, we prove monotonic stability, execution safety, eventual stabilization, fallback completeness, and equivalence to a gear-constrained Markov decision process. For multi-agent cyber-physical systems (CPS), we apply the established \smart{} managed-autonomy lifecycle and map runtime evidence into its four governance states (\Stable{}/\Meta{}/\Assisted{}/\Regulated{}). Consensus gating, swarm-level Lyapunov analysis, per-agent gear authority, and rendezvous control provide distributed safety and stability guarantees, including zero collision under the stated assumptions. We evaluate the resulting runtime on a three-agent UR5 robotic assembly cell using fault magnitudes calibrated from the NIST \emph{Degradation Measurement of Robot Arm Position Accuracy} dataset across 10,000 Monte Carlo episodes. It achieves a 99.6% anomaly detection rate versus 2.1% for the single-agent baseline, reduces detection latency by $3.5\times$, and supplies a formal physical-workspace safety certificate. The execution gears act as micro-level permissions beneath the \smart{} runtime governance states, separating action control from autonomy governance.