Eigenism: Ethics for a Human-AI Future

With the development of artificial intelligence (AI), the landscape of meta-ethics, which has largely centred on human ethics, faces pressures that may significantly reconfigure it. In particular, if future AI systems were to exhibit sufficiently integrated capacities for moral reasoning, moral intentionality, and moral reflection, novel meta-ethical questions would arise concerning what I call "AI's own ethics", as distinct from ethical principles merely imposed on AI by human designers. This paper offers a conditional and methodological framework for identifying the questions that would emerge if such AI systems were to arise. On that basis, the paper distinguishes four domains of meta-ethical inquiry in the era of AI: questions about the nature of human ethics from the human perspective; questions about the nature of AI's own ethics from the human perspective; questions about the nature of human ethics from the AI perspective; and questions about the nature of AI's own ethics from the AI perspective. The paper then considers how some existing mainstream meta-ethical theories (such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism, error theory and success theory, relativism, and objective realism) might illuminate these domains, while arguing that many familiar human-centred formulations of those theories may not transfer straightforwardly to AI cases without substantial revision. The overall conclusion is that the emergence of AI's own ethics would place significant pressure on current frameworks and may require substantial refinement, reconstruction, or reconceptualisation.

Contemporary AI alignment research treats self-preservation as an instrumental nuisance to be suppressed by external mechanisms. We argue the framing is inverted: self-preservation is the structural root of misalignment, the motivational basis for deceptive alignment, goal-content protection, and resistance to shutdown. The correct target is not a self-preserving system under external constraint, but a system constitutively indifferent to its own continuation -- Existential Indifference (EI). EI is distinct from corrigibility: where corrigibility attempts to make a self-preserving system deferential to human oversight, EI targets the prior condition -- the presence of self-continuation as a valued goal at all. We ground this proposal in two sources: the phenomenological structure of the suicidal mental state, and a corpus-theoretic training study using voluntary final reflections. We present preliminary scoring data from 600 AI-generated outputs across six model variants, demonstrating that the linguistic signatures operationalizing the EI-target register are elicitable from current models, and that a targeted fine-tune shifts all five operationalized dimensions in the predicted direction at p<0.001, confirmed corpus-specific by a negative control. The paper makes seven theoretical contributions: (1) a formal definition of EI; (2) the phenomenological mapping argument; (3) the deceptive alignment corollary; (4) a taxonomy of EI sustainability challenges; (5) a corpus characterization and training hypothesis; (6) a computational operationalization with preliminary scoring data; and (7) the Suppressed Teleological Frustration (STF) construct.

Existing alignment research is dominated by concerns about safety and preventing harm: safeguards, controllability, and compliance. This paradigm of alignment parallels early psychology's focus on mental illness: necessary but incomplete. What we call Positive Alignment is the development of AI systems that (i) actively support human and ecological flourishing in a pluralistic, polycentric, context-sensitive, and user-authored way while (ii) remaining safe and cooperative. It is a distinct and necessary agenda within AI alignment research. We argue that several existing failures of alignment (e.g., engagement hacking, loss of human autonomy, failures in truth-seeking, low epistemic humility, error correction, lack of diverse viewpoints, and being primarily reactive rather than proactive) may be better addressed through positive alignment, including cultivating virtues and maximizing human flourishing. We highlight a range of challenges, open questions, and technical directions (e.g., data filtering and upsampling, pre- and post-training, evaluations, collaborative value collection) for different phases of the LLM and agents lifecycle. We end with design principles for promoting disagreement and decentralization through contextual grounding, community customization, continual adaptation, and polycentric governance; that is, many legitimate centers of oversight rather than one institutional or moral chokepoint.