Some claim that AI agents will free workers from the boring parts of their jobs, yet little is known about how workers themselves identify which tasks should be automated. Prior research focuses on occupations, overlooking that workers experience varying levels of meaning across tasks within the same role. We address this gap with a task-level analysis grounded in Graeber's theory of bullshit jobs. Using ratings from 202 workers on 171 workplace tasks, we (1) validate a five-item scale of perceived bullshitness, (2) show that perceived bullshitness strongly predicts desire for AI delegation, and (3) find that such tasks are also seen as requiring less human oversight. Together, these findings suggest that tasks perceived as bullshit are natural candidates for AI delegation, aligning worker preferences with perceived feasibility.
Current benchmarks for occupational AI agents are scoped primarily by economic values, telling a replacement story. We introduce JobBench, which evaluates AI agents on the workflows that experts identify as high-priority for delegation, empowering humans based on their needs instead of replacing them with GDP value. JobBench covers 130 agentic tasks across 35 occupations. Each task is packaged as a workspace of heterogeneous reference files, requiring the agent to reason through the cluttered information streams of real professional work. Outputs are graded by a fact-anchored chain of rubrics, averaging 35.6 binary criteria per task. We evaluate 36 models; the strongest, Claude Opus~4.7 under Claude Code, reaches only 45.9 %. We hope JobBench shifts the community's target labour-market effect from replacement to enhancement: building agents that do what humans actually want delegated, not only what is most economically valuable.
A growing body of literature measures the extent to which occupations are exposed to AI, yet existing measures capture where AI could perform tasks rather than whether workers have actually adopted it. We introduce a distinct tier of exposure, delegated exposure, which records whether a worker has committed a task to AI by embedding it into a structured workflow. We operationalize this concept through the Agentic Adoption Index (AAI), measuring how closely an occupation's tasks align with the agentic routines that practitioners have built and shared. Using semantic embeddings of roughly 888,000 agent skill specifications from public GitHub repositories, we compute their similarity to nearly 18,000 O*NET task statements and aggregate these scores to the occupational level. We present three main findings. First, the occupations where task delegation concentrates differ sharply from those identified as most vulnerable by pre-AI automation frameworks. Second, the AAI aligns more closely with measures of technical capability than with measures of current conversational LLM use. Third, for occupations requiring a bachelor's degree or less, the AAI increases alongside average wage levels; however, this relationship reverses for occupations requiring a master's degree or higher, where adoption declines among higher earners. These patterns replicate on an independently collected corpus of agent skills from the Manus Skills Marketplace. This lower adoption among highly educated, high-earning workers may reflect tasks that inherently resist advance specification or professional discretion over the pacing of workflow codification. Distinguishing these mechanisms will require longitudinal measurement.
To anticipate socio-technical risks from AI agents, organizations need taxonomies to classify them. However, existing AI risk taxonomies focus on broad risks and do not capture job-specific risks introduced by agents. To address this gap, we make three main contributions. First, we developed a multi-layer framework from a literature review of AI agents. The framework models three core components and their interactions: agents, goals, and environment. Second, we embedded this framework in a structured prompt and applied it to descriptions of 2,078 job tasks from the O*NET database, producing 8,356 risk scenarios labeled by severity and deployment mode (automation or augmentation). We validated these scenarios with 45 workers across 10 job roles and an independent LLM judge, confirming their plausibility and alignment with job tasks. Finally, we extended an existing taxonomy to create a 15-category taxonomy of workplace AI agent risks that covers all our risk scenarios. Our analysis highlights four findings. First, augmentation is not inherently safe because overreliance on agents can gradually erode workers' skills and oversight. Second, Erroneous Agent Actions accounts for the largest share of risk scenarios and has the highest concentration of severe risks. Many arise at the human-agent boundary. Third, automation is associated mainly with organizational risks, while augmentation is associated mainly with risks to workers. Fourth, workers found our taxonomy easier to use for a risk classification task than two other taxonomies and preferred it in 64% of non-tied comparisons with a recent generative AI risk taxonomy. These findings show that workplace AI agent risks do not arise from agents alone; they also depend on how people work with agents and how agents are deployed. Safer workplaces require not only safer agents but also carefully designed human-AI agent collaboration.
Gabriele La Malfa, Lakmal Meegahapola, Edyta Bogucka +4