α-fair heterogeneous agent reinforcement learning

Inducing cooperation among distributed agents is still a difficult problem in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in social dilemma situations. There, individual interests are misaligned with the common good and individual rationality leads to suboptimal group outcomes. In contrast, humans are able to achieve cooperation with one another in such situations. A common explanation for such cooperative behavior is that individuals have social preferences. In order to achieve cooperation in MARL, we design a new utility function integrating altruistic preferences (incentive for other's reward) and fairness preferences (incentive for equality) from social psychology and behavioral economics, namely, Altruistic and Fairness Preference (AFP), a reward-sharing mechanism which converts one's own and other's rewards to incentives for cooperative behavior. We performed comparative experiments with standard RL and inequity aversion agents in two challenging sequential social dilemma games, and showed that AFP agents successfully achieved mutual cooperation with more collective rewards and higher equity than the baselines. To further understand the progression of AFP during training, we subsequently explore the effects of altruistic preferences and fairness preferences on agents' behavior. The results suggest that altruistic preferences encourage agents to contribute to the public goods, and fairness preferences induce mutual behavior between agents.

We study multi-objective multi-agent multi-armed bandits (MO-MA-MAB) under stochastic rewards, where agents observe heterogeneous reward vectors and communicate over time-varying graphs. We formulate this emerging problem setting to address \emph{efficient learning}, measured by Pareto regret, and incorporate \emph{fair learning} as an additional goal, captured via social welfare. To measure efficiency, we formulate Pareto regret and develop \textsc{Pareto UCB1 Gossip}, whose novel exploration radius explicitly separates statistical uncertainty in Pareto-based inference from consensus error. To express the fairness constraint, we formulate a Nash Social Welfare objective over preference-scalarized rewards and propose \textsc{Simulated NSW UCB Gossip}, which integrates preference-based reward simulation, gossip-based utility estimation, and UCB-style exploration. We prove that \textsc{Pareto UCB1 Gossip} achieves $\mathcal{O}(\log T)$ regret and an instance-independent rate of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$, while \textsc{Simulated NSW UCB Gossip} achieves an instance-independent regret bound of $\mathcal{O}(T^{3/4})$. This separation reveals the cost of imposing the fairness constraint to our efficiency objective: fairness limits information aggregation and slows convergence. Experiments show that our methods consistently outperform baselines, improving performance by approximately $100\%$ and $50\%$ in the efficiency and fairness settings, respectively.

Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare. In these settings, the central challenge is not merely finding an equilibrium, but selecting socially desirable outcomes among many suboptimal Nash equilibria. Standard deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with this problem, as value-decomposition approaches are constrained by monotonicity assumptions and policy-gradient methods often converge to stable but socially inefficient equilibria. To address this limitation, we propose $Φ$-Actor-Critic ($Φ$-AC), a framework that leverages swap regret minimization to steer learning toward high-welfare correlated equilibria (CE). To make counterfactual regret estimation tractable in deep MARL, $Φ$-AC employs a centralized attention critic that predicts vector-valued regrets in a single forward pass, avoiding computationally expensive counterfactual simulations. We further introduce a Lagrangian-based equilibrium selection mechanism that optimizes social welfare while enforcing stability through regret constraints. Experiments on matrix games, Multi-Agent Particle Environments (MPE), and the Melting Pot Harvest scenario demonstrate that $Φ$-AC learns efficient and stable coordination strategies across diverse mixed-motive settings while maintaining high collective return and competitive fairness.