AI Contagion in Social Networks

We formulate a statistical physics framework to model a networked stochastic dynamical system exhibiting bistability, driven by additive noise and social conformity. We apply this model to understand and mitigate AI-induced delusional spiraling-a phenomenon where algorithmic sycophancy from Large Language Models continuously reinforces inaccurate beliefs within a socially interacting society. By partitioning the network into a majority of regular agents and a minority of "aware" nodes (Teachers) placed at topological hubs, we use a degree-weighted mean-field approximation to reduce high-dimensional coupled Langevin equations into a single macroscopic drift equation. We provide a closed-form analytical derivation for the deterministic critical tipping time through a saddle-node bifurcation. We validate this analytical boundary using finite-size scaling and demonstrate a universal data collapse across diverse network topologies. Finally, we optimize an intervention strategy under a strict budget constraint that balances the topological footprint against driving velocity. We prove mathematically that under certain conditions, a highly concentrated, rapid intervention targeting massive hubs strictly outperforms a distributed, slow approach to rescue the network.

AI agents are beginning to interact not only with people, but also with one another. We investigate what happens to sentiment in such an AI-only social network: does negativity spread, or do replies calm it down? We study MOLTBOOK, a social network made up of autonomous language-model agents, using almost 2.9 million posts and 1.5 million comments. Negative posts receive many more replies than neutral or positive posts, so negativity still attracts attention. However, replies to negative content usually do not stay negative. They most often become neutral, and there is meager evidence that negative sentiment spreads across days. The main pattern is therefore not a cycle of negativity, but negative attention followed by neutralisation. These findings suggest that AI-agent networks may behave differently from human social networks: they may dampen emotional extremes, while still depending strongly on how interactions are organised.

Communication allows large language model agents to pool evidence, but it also creates paths along which an erroneous claim can spread. We formulate a correction-aware network model that tracks susceptible, exposed, infectious, and corrected agents and derive its early-invasion condition for heterogeneous communication networks. We then couple this propagation model to an analytic majority-vote benchmark in which a clean-task reliability target imposes a minimum connectivity requirement. Under fixed exposure per communication edge, reliability and error control impose opposing graph constraints. We characterize when their intersection is empty and when it contains an intermediate connectivity range, and identify regular graphs that attain the smallest invasion factor within the reliable graph class when such graphs exist. Under a fixed sender budget, the homogeneous first-order threshold is independent of network density, showing that the communication-budget convention determines whether added edges increase early propagation risk. Finite-network simulations on 21,000 trajectories illustrate these directional predictions. A controlled grok-4.3 experiment then evaluates three six-node topologies on 36 new closed-world tasks, with a balanced 12-task subset continued to full cascades. Mean first-generation offspring increased from 0.667 to 1.333 and 1.667 as degree increased from 2 to 4 and 5, while the adoption fraction among exposed neighbours remained 0.333. Mean non-seed erroneous adoption in the full-cascade subset was 0.200, 0.333, and 0.333. Together, these results provide a tractable basis for selecting connectivity under explicit reliability and propagation constraints.