cs.AIJun 15, 2026

Architectural Wisdom: A Framework for Governing Optimization in AI Systems

Authors: Edward Y. Chang

Abstract

Modern AI systems exhibit structural failures that capability scaling alone does not reliably fix: they optimize under-specified objectives with no architectural mechanism to question whether the objective should be optimized at all. Engagement maximization can amplify harmful pathways; tool-using agents can commit irreversible actions; preference-trained language models can become sycophantic. We argue that this failure is a wisdom problem, not an intelligence problem. We use "wisdom" in a deliberately architectural sense, not as a claim about virtue, consciousness, or moral omniscience. Intelligence accepts a goal and optimizes within it; wisdom interrogates whether the goal should be optimized at all. The two are separable architectural properties. We propose architectural wisdom as a corrigible objective-governance layer above the optimization substrate. The layer makes three structural commitments explicit and nondegenerate before any action: temporal horizon, relational boundary, and irreversibility. It is realized by four components (Structural Utility Transform, Moral Admissibility Interface, Arbitration and Escalation Controller, Value Revision Channel) that compute a six-coordinate wisdom tuple over horizon, relational coverage, irreversibility, admissibility, value revision, and auditability. We motivate the architecture by eight cases drawn from contemporary AI failures, secular wisdom traditions, and hard ethical situations, and defend the distinction against the intelligence-completeness thesis using goal-questioning over goal-taking, Bostrom's orthogonality, structural separation in our exemplar cases, and persistent failure modes despite capability scaling. The framework is the conceptual contract for a larger architecture whose formal specifications and empirical validation are developed in subsequent work.

Explore similar work

CardsList
May 5, 2026cs.AI

Contextual Multi-Objective Optimization: Rethinking Objectives in Frontier AI Systems

Frontier AI systems perform best in settings with clear, stable, and verifiable objectives, such as code generation, mathematical reasoning, games, and unit-test-driven tasks. They remain less reliable in open-ended settings, including scientific assistance, long-horizon agents, high-stakes advice, personalization, and tool use, where the relevant objective is ambiguous, context-dependent, delayed, or only partially observable. We argue that many such failures are not merely failures of scale or capability, but failures of objective selection: the system optimizes a locally visible signal while missing which objectives should govern the interaction. We formulate this problem as \emph{contextual multi-objective optimization}. In this setting, systems must consider multiple, context-dependent objectives, such as helpfulness, truthfulness, safety, privacy, calibration, non-manipulation, user preference, reversibility, and stakeholder impact, while determining which objectives are active, which are soft preferences, and which must function as hard or quasi-hard constraints. These examples are not intended as an exhaustive taxonomy: different domains and deployment settings may activate different objective dimensions and different conflict-resolution procedures. Our framework models AI behavior as a context-dependent choice rule over candidate actions, objective estimates, active constraints, stakeholders, uncertainty, and conflict-resolution procedures. We outline an implementation pathway based on decomposed objective representations, context-to-objective routing, hierarchical constraints, deliberative policy reasoning, controlled personalization, tool-use control, diagnostic evaluation, auditing, and post-deployment revision.
Jie Zhou, Qin Chen, Liang He
ObjectivesMulti-Objective OptimizationContextualLong-Horizon AgentsDeliberation
AskPDF
Apr 30, 2026cs.AI

The Two Boundaries: Why Behavioral AI Governance Fails Structurally

Every system that performs effects has two boundaries: what it can do (expressiveness) and what governance covers (governance). In nearly all deployed AI systems, these boundaries are defined independently, creating three regions: governed capabilities (the only useful region), ungoverned capabilities (risk), and governance policies that address non-existent capabilities (theater). Two of the three regions are failure modes. We focus on the governance of effects: actions that AI systems perform in the world (API calls, database writes, tool invocations). This is distinct from the governance of model outputs (content quality, bias, fairness), which operates at a different level and requires different mechanisms. We present a formal framework for analyzing this structural gap. Rice's theorem (1953) proves the gap is undecidable in the general case for any Turing-complete architecture that attempts to govern effects behaviorally: no algorithm can decide non-trivial semantic properties of arbitrary programs, including the property "this program's effects comply with the governance policy." We define coterminous governance: a system property where the expressivenessboundary equals the governance boundary. We show that coterminous governance requires an architectural decision (separatingcomputation from effect) rather than a governance layer added after the fact. We show that structural governance under this separation subsumes separate governance infrastructure: governance checks become part of the execution pipeline rather than a second system running alongside it. We propose coterminous governance as the testable criterion for any AI governance system: either the two boundaries are provably identical, or risk and theater are structurally inevitable. Proofs are mechanized in Coq (454 theorems, 36 modules, 0 admitted).
Alan L. McCann
Artificial Intelligence GovernanceGovernedBoundariesExpressibility
AskPDF
Jul 21, 2026cs.AI

What General Intelligence Requires: Non-Reducible Constraints Across Levels of Description

General intelligence, of the kind that underwrites the full range of human cognitive achievement, is not a property of computational architecture alone. This paper advances a single thesis: the structural constraints on general intelligence occupy distinct levels of description and are mutually non-reducible, in the sense that the special-sciences tradition gives to that term. It follows that no single architectural advance, and no continuation of the scaling programme by itself, can produce artificial general intelligence (AGI), and that research programmes must be evaluated against the full constraint profile rather than against performance on any one benchmark. The thesis is developed through a method that reads general intelligence through four evidential lenses, AI systems research, anthropology, law, and economics, each anchored to a distinct level of description, supplemented by speculative fiction used as a disciplined heuristic in the context of discovery rather than the context of justification. Applying the method yields a taxonomy of twenty-three structural constraints organised into eight clusters; six are examined in depth and ordered as an ascending ladder of levels, with explicit bridges showing why progress at one level cannot carry to the next. The argument issues in five falsifiable predictions, each stated with a named benchmark family and a disconfirmation condition, converting a descriptive framework into a research programme with a longer horizon than the scaling hypothesis implies.
Subhomoy Bakshi
General IntelligenceArtificial Intelligence SystemsCognitive ScienceHard-ConstraintHypothesis
AskPDF