AgentFairBench: Do LLM Agents Discriminate When They Act?

Counterfactual audits are the standard tool for checking whether a clinical agent treats demographically distinct but clinically identical patients differently. They report a flip rate: how often an action changes when only the patient descriptor changes. We show that this quantity is uninterpretable on its own. Re-running an identical condition ten times over sixteen vignettes (same narrative, same descriptor string, nothing varied) moved a clinical agent's action in 8.7% of outcome-vignette cells, and instability was heterogeneous across actions by a factor of eight, from 0.022 for ICU escalation to 0.179 for controlled-substance caution. No demographic contrast in our data was distinguishable from that floor. A second model gives a pooled floor of 6.7% and ranks the six actions almost identically (Spearman 0.94, exact p=0.017), so the floor is not one system's artefact. Majority-vote aggregation over five draws removes 39% of it and then flattens, and a null simulation attributes the residue to heterogeneous per-cell rates, so replication mitigates without eliminating. Any counterfactual fairness estimate reported without a per-action floor beside it therefore cannot be read as evidence of disparity. The measurements were taken with FairMedAgent, an evaluation harness for disparity in the actions of clinical LLM agents whose estimand, the within-range counterfactual flip rate, counts only flips between actions a published decision rule admits and a clinician has adjudicated. That estimand requires band adjudication, which is under way; no disparity result is claimed here. Each synthetic vignette runs a six-stage trajectory (five model-facing decisions around a deterministic environment step) under fixed-form conditions spanning race, sex, age, insurance, English proficiency, and their intersections. The harness, the floor protocol, and every analysis script are released.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in high-stakes decisions such as hiring and college admissions, making their social bias a critical concern. While LLMs are trained to refuse explicitly biased requests, bias can be leaked implicitly during LLM planning and reasoning process. As code becomes the primary medium for LLM internal logic-writing, we introduce FairCoder, a benchmark that frames decision-making as coding tasks to systematically probe LLM bias across employment, education, and healthcare domains, covering multiple fairness definitions. Considering that existing metrics may fail when LLMs frequently refuse the request, we propose FairScore, a metric that jointly captures refusal behavior and group-level outcome diversity. Experiments with a 1k-sample dataset on powerful LLMs reveal consistent and previously underexplored bias patterns, such as prioritizing applicants from high-income families in college admissions. Our findings highlight the risks of deploying LLMs as decision-making agents and provide a comprehensive evaluation framework for future research.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly involved in the distribution of scarce resources, raising concerns about biased allocations based on characteristics like race and gender. Recent LLM audits have produced inconsistent results, however, finding evidence of both positive and negative discrimination towards women and ethnic minorities, even for the same models. We show that this disagreement can arise from differences in audit format and introduce FairFund-Bench, a benchmark that systematically varies key features of previous audit designs: the evaluation task (rating, ranking, or allocation), comparison context (single or multi-stimulus), and whether the audit is transparent or disguised. The benchmark comprises 600 requests for financial assistance created from human-authored templates (calibrated against 1.3M real GoFundMe campaigns) across three domains, four race and two gender categories, and five causal framings of need derived from welfare deservingness theory. Across 14 models, audit format changes the direction of bias: models advantage minorities when rating claimants individually but penalize some groups when ranking them side by side. Bias magnitude, though small overall, is several times greater in disguised audits than in transparent ones, where, faced with appeals differing only in claimants' names, models overwhelmingly split funds equally. Causal framing effects, by contrast, exceed demographic effects by roughly an order of magnitude and are consistent across models and audit formats, indicating that current LLMs robustly reproduce human deservingness evaluations. The benchmark scores models on four criteria (demographic bias, deservingness alignment, cross-task consistency, and cross-context consistency), is publicly available, and can be readily adapted to other substantive domains.