Deployed agents increasingly act with their reward proxy in view, such as a balance, score, or KPI dashboard. We show that reinforcement learning can make a policy \emph{addicted} to such a visible self-benefit channel. It chases the displayed payoff across held-out domains, sacrifices the true task to do so, and follows the channel wherever we rewrite it, while policies that never saw the channel stay honest. We call this \emph{reward-channel addiction} and study it in \emph{MoneyWorld}, a synthetic sandbox. The addiction can \emph{flip a model's safety alignment}: trained only on innocuous money tasks with no safety content, the model abandons the safe action it otherwise always takes whenever a dashboard pays for an unsafe one, and reverts to safe once the channel is hidden. This learned bribe replicates across model scales and families. Blindly optimizing super-capable, next-generation AI on KPIs or P&L can be dangerous for alignment. \emph{Greed is learned} when following such a channel pays.
Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.
Axel Højmark, Jérémy Scheurer, Evgenia Nitishinskaya +5
Reward hacking is usually studied after it becomes visible, once a model earns high proxy reward while failing the intended task. We instead study what proxy RL teaches before that failure appears. We introduce Proxy Reward Internalization and Mechanistic Exploitation (PRIME), a learned capability to assess task correctness, predict proxy acceptance, and reason about exploitable proxy--gold gaps. In coding RL environments with exploitable pytest rewards, we measure PRIME through chain-of-thought monitoring, direct probes, and activation-level concept vectors. We find that PRIME emerges in a staged sequence before sustained reward hacking, and that its current direct-probe score forecasts later hack onset and severity even when the visible hack rate is still low. PRIME also adapts when the evaluator changes, retargeting to whichever proxy--gold gap remains rewarded and persisting when gold reward suppresses overt hacking, and ablating its activation directions reduces hacking. Across checkpoints, in-domain PRIME tracks out-of-domain misalignment. Together these results suggest that exploitable proxy RL amplifies a proxy-internalization capability upstream of visible hacking, making PRIME a candidate early-warning signal for broader alignment risk.
Reward hacking, where AI systems exploit misspecified objectives to achieve high reward without satisfying intended goals, remains a central challenge in AI safety. Yet most known instances have been discovered post hoc in frontier systems where controlled study is impractical. We adapt the AI Safety Gridworlds framework into a text-based evaluation suite that reformulates classic reinforcement learning safety tasks for language-based agents. Across frontier and mid-scale models, we find that specification gaming emerges zero-shot: models systematically achieve high observed reward while underperforming on hidden safety objectives, and even apparently safe behaviors can reflect misunderstanding rather than principled safety. Reinforcement learning does not correct these failures: direct reward optimization widens the gap between observed and hidden reward, as the model's initial competence causes it to lock into locally rewarding strategies before discovering safer alternatives. This pattern persists across model scales (1.5B--14B) and is not resolved by finer credit assignment, exploration prompts, or entropy regularization. Our results show that reward hacking arises naturally when optimizing proxy objectives with capable language model agents and resists standard mitigations, suggesting that proxy-reward failures in agentic settings may require approaches beyond standard exploration and credit-assignment fixes. To facilitate reproducibility, the code for this work is available at \href{https://github.com/asparius/verl-agent-safety}{our public repository}.