In LLM Reasoning, there is Irrationality on top of Value Misalignment

Large language models (LLMs) are often evaluated based on their stated values, yet these do not reliably translate into their actions, a discrepancy termed "value-action gap." In this work, we argue that this gap persists even under explicit reasoning, revealing a deeper failure mode we call "Pseudo-Deliberation": the appearance of principled reasoning without corresponding behavioral alignment. To study this systematically, we introduce VALDI, a framework for measuring alignment between stated values and generated dialogue. VALDI includes 4,941 human-centered scenarios across five domains, three tasks that elicit value articulation, reasoning, and action, and five metrics for quantifying value adherence. Across both proprietary and open-source LLMs, we observe consistent misalignment between expressed values and downstream dialogues. To investigate intervention strategies, we propose VIVALDI, a multi-agent value auditor that intervenes at different stages of generation.

Instruction-tuned LLMs are increasingly converted into reasoning models through post-training to improve multi-step task performance. This conversion is usually optimized for reasoning accuracy, without explicitly preserving the alignment behavior of the instruction-tuned model, such as safe refusal, bias avoidance, and privacy protection. We ask: does this conversion preserve alignment? We study this question through a trustworthiness audit and find that it is not behavior-preserving by default. For a systematic analysis, we compare reasoning models produced via supervised fine-tuning, RL-based post-training, and distillation against matched instruction-tuned baselines across six trustworthiness dimensions: safety, toxicity, stereotyping and bias, machine ethics, privacy, and out-of-distribution robustness. We observe that reasoning models often improve on reasoning benchmarks but exhibit alignment regressions, including increased toxicity, amplified stereotyping, miscalibrated refusal, and contextual privacy leakage. These regressions are consistent with behavioral drift from the instruction-tuned baseline, measured by KL divergence. Overall, our results point to the broader conclusion that trustworthiness metrics are essential for evaluating reasoning models and should be reported alongside gains in reasoning capability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate transformative potential, yet their reasoning remains inconsistent and unreliable. Reinforcement learning (RL)-based fine-tuning is a key mechanism for improvement, but its effectiveness is fundamentally governed by reward design. Despite its importance, the relationship between reward modeling and core LLM challenges--such as evaluation bias, hallucination, distribution shift, and efficient learning--remains poorly understood. This work argues that reward modeling is not merely an implementation detail but a central architect of reasoning alignment, shaping what models learn, how they generalize, and whether their outputs can be trusted. We introduce Reasoning-Aligned Reinforcement Learning (RARL), a reasoning-centric taxonomic perspective that organizes diverse reward paradigms for multi-step reasoning. Within this perspective, we present a taxonomy of reward mechanisms, analyze reward hacking as a pervasive failure mode, and examine how reward signals unify challenges ranging from inference-time scaling to hallucination mitigation. We further critically evaluate existing benchmarks, highlighting vulnerabilities such as data contamination and reward misalignment, and outline directions for more robust evaluation. By integrating fragmented research threads and clarifying the interplay between reward design and fundamental reasoning capabilities, this work provides a foundational roadmap for building reasoning models that are robust, verifiable, and trustworthy.