BARD-MARL: Byzantine-Agent Detection for Learned Communication in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Cooperation is central to multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), yet learned coordination can be fragile when external perturbations disrupt inter-agent interactions. Prior robust MARL methods have primarily considered value-oriented attacks, leaving a gap in robustness when interaction structures themselves are corrupted. In this paper, we propose an interaction-breaking adversarial learning (IBAL) framework that takes an information-theoretic view to construct attacks that impede coordination by perturbing agents' observations and actions, and trains agents to perform reliably under such disruptions. Empirically, our approach improves robustness over existing robust MARL baselines across diverse attack settings and yields stronger performance even under agent-missing scenarios. Our code is available at https://sunwoolee0504.github.io/IBAL.

We study online cooperative control of a multi-agent system under Byzantine attacks. Namely, an unknown, fixed subset of agents are Byzantine comprised and can stealthily overwrite its own coordinates of the team's planned joint action after observing that plan. The learner observes planned actions, public rewards, and public states, but neither the overwrite nor the executed joint action. Our objective is security: to optimize the team performance against the worst overwrites and achieve the optimal security value. We first show that the attacker's information determines the geometry. An attacker that observes the planned action induces an exact $(s,a)$-rectangular robust Markov decision process (MDP) whose rows are convex hulls of overwrite-induced public-outcome laws, whereas a blind attacker induces an $s$-rectangular model. We then identify the information-theoretic limit of security learning, showing that the security regret decomposes exactly into return regret against the response generating the data and a cumulative response gap $D_K$. Two indistinguishable horizon-one instances force $Ω(K)$ expected security regret while return regret is zero, showing that dependence on $D_K$ is unavoidable. Finally, we develop a stage-tied robust estimation-to-decisions learner and prove a regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal O}\!\left(H^2S\sqrt{AK}\right)+\mathbb E[D_K]$. Our studies thus provide comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic foundations of reliable multi-agent systems under Byzantine attacks.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) often relies on communication to mitigate partial observability, yet most existing protocols treat messages as flat dense vectors detached from the structure of the observations they summarize. This design overlooks an important source of inductive bias in many cooperative environments, where observations naturally follow a hierarchy such as groups and entities. We propose \textsc{HiComm}, a plug-in communication module that grounds messages in the sender's hierarchical observation. \textsc{HiComm} is receiver-driven: the receiver issues a query, and the hierarchy is resolved through a three-stage decoding process that first selects a group, then a sender, and then an entity within that group, returning the corresponding feature slice as the message. This converts communication from unstructured vector transmission into structured information retrieval over the sender's observation hierarchy. We instantiate this mechanism with Straight-Through Gumbel-Softmax for differentiable discrete selection and a lightweight shared projection design that attaches to standard MARL pipelines. Experiments across cooperative MARL tasks with different observation structures and coordination demands show that \textsc{HiComm} matches or outperforms representative learned communication baselines while reducing communication volume by up to $23\times$ per receiver per episode.