Learning Moral Diversity: Modelling Individual Perspectives in Moral Classification of Texts

LLM annotators are increasingly used in computational social science (CSS), but it is unclear whether their alignment-shaped errors preserve the empirical conclusions a researcher would report. We audit three open-source 7B instruction-tuned models (Zephyr, Mistral-Instruct, Qwen2.5-Instruct) across six TweetEval tasks under four prompt conditions (72 cells) and find that social-desirability failures do not run in a single direction. Zephyr exhibits leniency bias, systematically under-applying harmful labels (offensive language: false benign rate 0.729, false alarm rate 0.031). Mistral and Qwen exhibit overcorrection, over-applying the same labels (Mistral hate-speech FAR = 0.604). All three models exhibit neutrality bias on abortion stance, underestimating opposition prevalence by 24 to 40 percentage points and inflating the neutral label. None of the four prompting interventions we test (neutral, safety framing, depersonalized, chain-of-thought) corrects these failures across models; safety framing can worsen stance distortion. Strikingly, Zephyr's hate-speech prevalence estimate matches the gold rate exactly while its class-conditional errors are large in both directions, an accidental cancellation that misleads aggregate validation. We translate these patterns into a three-part taxonomy with diagnostic FBR/FAR signatures and a lightweight gold-sample validation protocol. The headline for trustworthy CSS: a model that looks calibrated on aggregate metrics can still flip the substantive empirical conclusion a researcher would report.

A human's moral decision depends heavily on the context. Yet research on LLM morality has largely studied fixed scenarios. We address this gap by introducing Contextual MoralChoice, a dataset of moral dilemmas with systematic contextual variations known from moral psychology to shift human judgment: consequentialist, emotional, and relational. Evaluating 22 LLMs, we find that nearly all models are context-sensitive, shifting their judgments towards rule-violating behavior. Comparing with a human survey, we find that models and humans are most triggered by different contextual variations, and that a model aligned with human judgments in the base case is not necessarily aligned in its contextual sensitivity. This raises the question of controlling contextual sensitivity, which we address with an activation steering approach that can reliably increase or decrease a model's contextual sensitivity. Code and data: https://github.com/adrian-sauter/contextual_moralchoice.

We evaluate whether enabling provider-exposed reasoning mode changes moral judgments within the same model checkpoint. Across 100 moral-judgment scenarios and five frontier reasoning-trained LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT 5.5, Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.1, and Qwen3.5 397B), aggregate binary-verdict agreement remains high and statistically indistinguishable between instant and thinking modes (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.78 vs. 0.79). However, disagreement is concentrated in 21 model-disputed scenarios, where instant-mode agreement is near chance (alpha = 0.08). On these scenarios, reasoning directionally narrows cross-model disagreement, increasing mean pairwise agreement from 5.4 to 6.7 out of 10. Reasoning also reduces demographic-judgment inconsistency in three of five models and does not increase it for any model. Across all five model families, reasoning changes self-labeled ethical frameworks more often than binary verdicts.