Neural Parameter Calibration for Finite-State Mean Field Games
Authors: Anna C. M. Thöni, Grégoire Lambrecht, Gökçe Dayanıklı, Yonathan Efroni, Tal Kachman, Mathieu Laurière
Organizations: Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands · New York University, New York, NY · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL · Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel · New York University Shanghai, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China
Mean field games efficiently approximate a very large population of strategic agents. While these games can aid the understanding of complex systems, their deployment in real-world settings is challenged by the specification of their parameters: mean field games (MFGs) often involve hidden preferences, constraints, and interactions that can rarely be theoretically derived or directly observed. To address this gap, we present a neural network-based framework for learning parametric, finite-state MFGs from observed population dynamics. To do so, we formulate the parameter calibration as an inverse problem and use implicit differentiation to backpropagate through the games' equilibrium. The resulting approach is fully differentiable and enables us to estimate flexible trajectory-wise parameter paths, including state- and time-dependent specifications without requiring observations of the individual agents' actions or rewards. We provide a proof for the exactness of the gradient computation in a discrete-time formulation. We validate our framework through numerical experiments across four systems of increasing complexity, ranging from synthetic linear-quadratic benchmarks to real-world urban mobility datasets.
We study inverse reinforcement learning for discrete-time, infinite-horizon mean-field games (MFGs) under an average-reward criterion. Expert demonstrations are assumed to arise from a stationary mean-field equilibrium under an unknown reward, and the goal is to recover a policy explaining the observed behaviour via the maximum causal entropy principle. We formulate the inverse problem by enforcing consistency with the expert mean-field term and long-run feature expectations, treating two reward classes within a unified occupation-measure framework. For finite-dimensional linear rewards, we give a convex dual reformulation with an explicit log-partition objective, and prove smoothness and curvature properties justifying constant-step-size gradient descent. For infinite-dimensional RKHS rewards, we develop a Lagrangian relaxation whose inner-maximising policy is characterised by a soft Bellman equation. The main obstacle is the absence of a discount-factor contraction. We resolve this by introducing a minorisation-based sub-stochastic kernel that yields a strict contraction of the soft Bellman operator. We establish Fréchet differentiability and Lipschitz smoothness of the log-likelihood score, leading to a gradient ascent algorithm with convergence guarantees. Two numerical examples, a malware-spread MFG and an RKHS-based consumer-choice model, show that the recovered policies closely match expert behaviour.
Mean Field Games (MFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling the collective behavior of large populations of interacting agents. In this paper, we address the problem of Imitation Learning (IL) in MFGs subject to common noise, where the population distribution evolves stochastically. This stochasticity compels agents to adopt population-aware policies to respond to aggregate shocks. We formulate two distinct learning objectives: recovering a Nash equilibrium and maximizing performance against an expert population. We investigate two imitation proxies: Behavioral Cloning (BC) and Adversarial (ADV) divergence. We then establish finite-sample error bounds showing that minimizing these proxies effectively controls both the policy's exploitability and its performance gap relative to the expert. Furthermore, we propose a numerical framework using generalized Fictitious Play and Deep Learning to compute expert population-aware policies. Through experiments on three environments we demonstrate that standard population-unaware policies fail to capture the equilibrium dynamics. Our results highlight that learning population-aware policies is crucial to avoid being misled by the randomness inherent in common noise.
We study the subclass of potential mean-field games in which the running interaction cost and the terminal target cost are both expressed through reproducing-kernel maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) penalties, and develop a computational framework that exploits this kernel structure. Both costs are estimated from finite-sample empirical distributions using a random Fourier U-statistic representation that is unbiased and has linear cost in the batch size. The drift of the controlled diffusion is parametrized by a neural network and trained via stochastic gradient descent. For population near-minimizers we prove convergence to the terminal-constrained problem as the penalty diverges, and show that the same limit is recovered almost surely when the learned controls are evaluated on independent finite samples under explicit coupling conditions on the penalty, random-feature count and sample size. The framework includes the kernel-MMD-penalty Schr{ö}dinger bridge problem as the special case of a vanishing interaction cost. Numerical experiments illustrate the method on the Schr{ö}dinger bridge problem in dimensions up to one hundred, and on an electric vehicle charging coordination problem with per-vehicle physical heterogeneity, where an aggregate-demand congestion cost represents price-feedback competition at the population level and the terminal MMD penalty shapes the state-of-charge distribution at the deadline.