cs.AIJun 10, 2026

AI Tokenomics: The Economics of Tokens, Computation, and Pricing in Foundation Models

Authors: Quanyan Zhu

Organizations: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University Tandon School of Engineering, 370 Jay Street, Room 1004, Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA

Abstract

Tokens have become the practical accounting unit for modern foundation model services, linking information processing, computation, memory use, energy expenditure, pricing, and economic value. This paper develops a framework for AI tokenomics: the study of how tokens are generated, consumed, priced, allocated, and optimized across AI systems. We connect token-level technical costs to workflow-level production functions, enterprise resource allocation, measurement and instrumentation methods, and emerging market-design questions. The framework shows that token expenditure and economic value are distinct: value depends on marginal productivity, workflow position, hidden reasoning activity, risk, and downstream propagation effects. The paper concludes by identifying open research directions in hidden-token measurement, empirical calibration, token productivity, dynamic allocation, and token-based markets.

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