Budget-Aware Keyboardless Interaction

Video Intelligence Surveillance (VIDINT) on over-the-shoulder footage is a proposed vector for monitoring human-computer interaction patterns without direct screen recording access. In this paper, we evaluate a Behavioral Intelligence (BEHINT) touch-detection framework designed to reconstruct keystroke events on mobile keypad interfaces from physical finger interactions. Our system integrates four parallel detection modalities: (1) anatomical hand landmarks via MediaPipe, (2) HSV skin color filtering, (3) temporal frame differencing for motion detection, and (4) shape-guided Canny edge analysis. We map relative touch coordinates to a reference screen layout to reconstruct typing sequences. Evaluation on a 120-frame first-person staged video of passcode entry reveals that while MediaPipe and Skin Detection fail to run autonomously due to partial hand occlusion and ambient noise, Motion-Only and Edge-Only configurations achieve F1-scores of 18.5% and 18.2%, respectively. The combined multi-modal configuration achieves an F1-score of 16.7% and a sequence similarity of 3.0% when mapped to the iOS passcode layout. We conduct ablation, resolution decay, noise sensitivity, and proximity threshold tuning to characterize the system's operational envelope. We then audit generalization on 5 real, publicly licensed third-person phone videos and find that the detector emits a median of 57 touch points per frame (peaking at 205), one to three orders of magnitude more than the rate of real taps, because the skin filter responds to the whole hand rather than to fingertip contact. The staged keystroke result does not survive contact with uncontrolled footage; the system does not achieve reliable keystroke reconstruction outside the calibrated staged setting.

Dynamic aspects of handwriting are critical for assessing developmental disorders such as dysgraphia and are typically captured using digitizing tablets. However, tablet-based sensing restricts analysis of Pen-Up behavior to a short proximity range above the writing surface, potentially missing high-lift in-air movements. As a proof of concept, we investigate whether top-view video can provide a complementary source of information for inferring pen-contact states without relying on tablet proximity sensing. We propose an interpretable hybrid pipeline combining pen-tip tracking using a YOLO-based detector with kinematic feature extraction and machine learning classification. A pilot dataset of diverse handwriting videos was manually annotated at the frame level and evaluation used a Leave-One-Video-Out (LOVO) protocol. The method achieved reliable event-level detection of Pen-Up segments, with an F_2 score up to 0.805, consistent with the emphasis on recall in a screening-oriented setting. These results support the feasibility of video-based Pen-Up detection as a low-cost and non-intrusive complement to digitizing tablets, and provide a foundation for future large-scale studies.

Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) on keyboards pose a significant security risk, as keystrokes can be inferred from typing acoustics, revealing sensitive information. Prior ASCA studies are limited by small-scale datasets with restricted diversity in users, keyboards, and environments, constraining analysis across devices, microphones, and noise conditions. We introduce HEAR, a dataset designed to study ASCA along three axes: keyboard generalization, noise adaptation, and user bias. HEAR contains recordings from 53 participants using 37 laptop keyboards, collected in three realistic settings: (1) external microphone capture, (2) device microphone capture without network noise, and (3) VoIP-based streaming capture. This enables controlled evaluation across users, keyboards, and environments. On HEAR, we establish an ASCA benchmark spanning conventional features and pre-trained representations from raw audio and spectrograms in unimodal and multimodal settings. We propose DECKER, a domain-invariant keystroke inference framework with four stages: (1) Keyboard Signature Normalization to reduce device coloration, (2) domain-adversarial disentanglement to suppress keyboard identity, (3) supervised cross-keyboard contrastive alignment to enforce key consistency, and (4) Acoustic Style Randomization to synthesize unseen keyboard responses. We further explore sentence-level inference using an LLM-based post-processing layer to refine keystroke sequences via linguistic context. Results on HEAR show DECKER improves keystroke identification over strong baselines, particularly in cross-keyboard and cross-user settings, with further gains from language-model rectification. These findings highlight that ASCA remains effective across diverse users, devices, and noisy environments, underscoring its practical security risk.