Financing Artificial Intelligence Infrastructure: Mapping AI Infrastructure Investment and Compute Governance Across Africa

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to be transformative for development, but Africa is currently facing a fragmented and challenging "AI divide". This paper provides an empirical analysis of the current state of the AI landscape and how it compares with Africa's technological preparedness for the future. In our analysis, we approach the "AI Divide" from three angles: infrastructure, accessibility, and human capacity. First, we look at the physical constraints that prevent Africa from integrating digitally. We then evaluate the human-centred factors that limit the development of AI technology on the continent. Finally, we examine the human capacity to develop AI systems on the continent and provide three focused case studies. Our investigation shows that the physical infrastructure needed to build an AI economy on the continent is lagging, with only 38% internet penetration, poor broadband coverage and less than 1% of all data centres globally. Other constraints include high data costs relative to income, gender-based digital divides, and the need to build more representative NLP models that can understand Africa's native languages. However, there are positive trends towards the emergence of local initiatives and grassroots movements, such as startups and universities, contributing to AI development on the continent. Based on these findings, we provide concrete recommendations to policymakers to help develop a more comprehensive and equitable AI ecosystem on the African continent.

This paper examines where final authority should sit once capable AI systems are embedded in organizational workflows. It compares two governance models. The first, frontier-provider sovereignty, assigns privileged authority to the provider of the most capable models and is reflected in contemporary arguments for frontier-model testing, release gating, transparency duties, and compute-related controls. The second, action-centered deployer sovereignty, places final authority over high-impact actions with the organization that authorizes the action, embeds it in a business process, and bears the downstream legal, operational, and commercial consequences. The paper combines comparative reading of public governance frameworks with implementation-informed analysis of runtime heterogeneity and enterprise control requirements. It compares EU AI Act guidance, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, recent Japanese AI policy instruments, and Canada's voluntary code and managerial guidance. Across these materials, the paper finds stronger support for distributed operational accountability than for unilateral frontier-provider control. It further argues that rapid enterprise adoption, declining provider transparency, and widening control gaps increase the value of a portable governance layer centered on governed action rather than on provider-native session objects. The conclusion is layered rather than absolutist: strong upstream authority remains justified for frontier capability gating, but final authority over concrete enterprise action is better located with the deployer and consequence-bearer.

The governance of open-weight artificial intelligence (AI) models has been framed as a binary choice: openness as risk, restriction as safety. This paper challenges that framing, arguing that access restrictions, without governed alternatives, may displace risks rather than reduce them. The global concentration of compute infrastructure makes open-weight models one of the most viable pathways to sovereign AI capacity in the Global South; restricting such access deepens asymmetries while driving proliferation into unsupervised settings. This analysis proposes that hardware-layer governance, including chip-level attestation mechanisms such as FlexHEG, trusted execution environments, confidential computing, and complementary software-layer safeguards, offers a defense-in-depth alternative to the current binary. A threat model taxonomy mapping misuse vectors to hardware, software, institutional, and liability layers illustrates why no single governance mechanism suffices. To operationalize this approach, the paper argues that effective AI governance as a dual-use technology will likely require a multilateral institutional architecture functionally analogous, though not identical, to the role performed by the IAEA in the nuclear domain, with explicit safeguards against the co-option of hardware controls for domestic repression. The relevant policy question is how to make openness safer through technical and institutional design while addressing the transition realities of legacy hardware, attestation at scale, and civil liberties protection.