Current large language models are extraordinary statistical engines. They compress vast amounts of text into useful patterns and can explain science, write code, imitate reasoning, and participate in philosophical conversation. Yet pattern mastery is not the same as general intelligence. A human infant begins with little explicit knowledge, but gradually discovers object permanence, cause and effect, other minds, bodily agency, and the persistence of the physical world. We make an argument that the path to artificial superintelligence (ASI) depends on a missing capacity we call \emph{situation perception}: the ability to construct, revise, and act within internal simulations of possible worlds across latent time. \emph{ perception} requires at least three core components: abstract prediction, long-term compressed memory, and active learning guided by objectives. In this work, we analyse why modern large language models remain incomplete, and propose the appropriate tests for measuring progress and consequences of machines that can simulate futures, pursue self-directed goals, and possibly judge their own creators.
Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind. We hypothesize that a central missing ingredient is not more capability but dimensional completeness. We propose that the believability of an artificial interlocutor -- the degree to which a user attributes an inner life to it, which we call perceived mind -- is governed by whether the agent expresses a small set of first-person stances that humans use as evidence of mind, and that this is separable from task intelligence. We name four such dimensions -- time, truth, entropy, and love -- each defined as a behavioral stance rather than a benchmark competency, each with a human analog and a concrete emulation path; the time dimension already has an author-reported prototype. We identify an observable behavior layer -- initiative (unprompted action) and cadence (the shape and timing of turns) -- through which the stances surface in conversation, both partially realized as deployed features in a production companion application. We state six falsifiable predictions that a later pre-registered study will test, separating those that are pre-registrable now from those that remain conjectures pending operationalization. This is a conceptual framework: it reports no human-subjects data, and its central comparative claims are predictions, not findings. Throughout we hold a firm boundary -- the object is inferrable interiority, not interiority; this is perception engineering, not a theory of machine consciousness -- and we treat the resulting attachment and manipulation risks as load-bearing rather than incidental.
Recent work suggests that Large Language Models (LLMs) are sensitive to the belief states of agents described by text, as measured by the false belief task (FBT), yet persistent concerns of construct validity remain. We adopt a developmental perspective, tracing the pattern of mental state reasoning behavior -- and likely preconditions for this behavior -- across multiple training stages in the Olmo2 and Pythia language model suites. We find that above-chance FBT performance depends both on model size and sufficient training volume, emerges relatively late in pretraining, and is most improved by post-training interventions (SFT, DPO) in the condition most diagnostic of mentalizing (False Belief, Implicit). However, FBT performance is fragile: consistent with past work, the use of non-factive verbs (e.g., thinks) increases false belief attributions even in the True Belief condition. To contextualize these findings, we track the emergence of situation modeling: the ability to report on basic factual properties of a described scene. Situation modeling accuracy generally precedes and exceeds FBT accuracy, yet situational representations also prove surprisingly incoherent in certain respects: when asked about the knowledge states of the Antagonist agent -- who always knows the item's true location -- Olmo2 13b is consistently influenced both by the Target agent's knowledge state and the presence of non-factive verbs. Together, these results suggest that larger, sufficiently trained models build partially coherent situation models in a developmentally appropriate sequence, yet display surprising fragility -- highlighting the value of developmental and stress-testing approaches for evaluating LLM capabilities.
The ability to recognize one's own limitations and decide whether to solve a problem or delegate is fundamental for reliable intelligent systems. Yet we show that modern large language models systematically lack this ability: across diverse model families and scales, they overestimate their competence and attempt queries they cannot solve. We refer to this ability as Capability Self-Assessment (CSA) and formulate it as a policy-learning problem, aiming to improve self-assessment while preserving the model's original capabilities. Our results show that reinforcement learning teaches CSA effectively, significantly outperforming supervised fine-tuning while preserving original capabilities. In contrast, supervised fine-tuning severely degrades the capabilities the model is meant to assess. Moreover, learned self-assessment behavior generalizes well out of distribution, suggesting that CSA is a transferable model trait. Finally, CSA is practically useful: it improves local-cloud decision making at inference time and provides a signal for targeted data selection during training.