Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit strong semantic capabilities, yet their resilience to manipulative linguistic patterns such as logical fallacies remains underexplored. Prior work has primarily examined whether LLMs can identify or classify fallacies, leaving their robustness against fallacious persuasion insufficiently studied. To address this gap, we introduce LoFa (Logical Fallacy), a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM robustness against fallacies. LoFa is constructed through a multi-agent pipeline that pairs factual questions with fallacious arguments, and is accompanied by a multi-round debate framework for assessing model resilience under sustained adversarial persuasion. To disentangle fallacy robustness from a model's inherent knowledge limitations, we further propose Logical Fallacy Resistance at k (LFR@k), a metric that quantifies resistance to fallacious attacks. Experiments show that LLMs exhibit varying levels of robustness across different fallacy types, revealing distinct vulnerability profiles among models.
Current evaluations of Large Language Models (LLMs) on logical fallacy detection focus on predicted labels, but do not establish whether those labels are supported by the reasoning the models provide. We propose ForEx (Formal Verification for Explainable Reasoning), a framework that translates LLM-generated explanations into Lean4 and verifies whether the translated rationale is derivable under encoded premises, not the logical validity of the original natural language argument. To distinguish prediction outcomes from the formal status of the supporting reasoning, we introduce the LLM Argument Verification Matrix, which separates label consistency from formal verification status. Experiments on LOGIC-Climate show that over 90% of LLM outputs can be translated into formal reasoning chains that pass verification, while agreement with human annotations remains around 20%. These results expose a systematic gap between formal derivability and label agreement, a distinction invisible to prediction-based metrics. ForEx moves LLM evaluation beyond label correctness toward machine-checkable analysis of formalized reasoning chains.
Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on logical reasoning benchmarks, yet their reliability remains uncertain. Existing evaluations rely on static benchmarks, which fail to assess robustness under logically equivalent transformations and often overestimate reasoning capability. We propose LGMT (Logic-Grounded Metamorphic Testing), an oracle-free framework that leverages first-order logic (FOL) to evaluate LLM reasoning. By deriving metamorphic relations from formal logical equivalences, LGMT constructs semantically invariant test cases and detects reasoning defects through cross-case consistency checking. Experiments on six state-of-the-art LLMs show that LGMT exposes substantial hidden defects missed by traditional reference-based evaluations. We further find that models are particularly sensitive to symbol-level and conclusion-level variations, and that advanced prompting such as Few-shot CoT only partially mitigates these issues. These results suggest that LLM evaluation should move beyond isolated correctness toward robustness under logical invariance. LGMT provides a principled and scalable approach for diagnosing reasoning failures.
As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as primary knowledge retrieval interfaces, their robustness against \textit{persuasion attacks}---attempts to inject misinformation or enforce counterfactuals---has become a critical safety concern. Existing red-teaming frameworks typically evaluate models in multi-turn dialogues where the target model retains full conversation history. We identify a critical flaw in this setting termed \textbf{Refusal Inertia''}: a model's initial refusal often propagates through subsequent turns largely to maintain contextual consistency, thereby masking its true vulnerability to sophisticated, isolated persuasion attempts. To rigorously evaluate the cold-start'' defense capabilities of SOTA models, we introduce the \textbf{SAST-IR} (Stateful Attacker, Stateless Target - Iterative Refinement) framework. By enforcing a memory wipe on the target while retaining the attacker's history, we simulate a worst-case adversarial setting using \textbf{multi-turn} (stateless) iterations. Leveraging \textbf{CP-Agent} (Cognitive Persuasion Agent), an enhanced diagnosis-guided agent, our experiments on the custom \textsc{CounterFact-Strict} dataset (N=50) yield alarming results: simple, diverse attack strategies achieved a staggering \textbf{96%} success rate, exposing severe brittleness in memory-less defense. Furthermore, we reveal a \textbf{``Complexity Paradox''}: while complex, iteratively refined attacks are effective, they often trigger defensive compliance, whereas simple strategies achieve a higher rate of genuine persuasion (\textbf{84.7%}). Our code and dataset are available at GitHub, https://github.com/cza1006/llm-persuasion-defense.