Agentic Business Process Management has gained momentum recently. The prospect is that the autonomy of AI agents, i.e., predominantly LLM-based agents, can be balanced with a certain level of robustness, tractability, and traceability through a combination with process technology. In this paper, we provide a classification framework for agentic orchestration options along properties such as task specificity, traceability and tractability, autonomy and reactivity, and correctness assurance and present qualitative decision criteria for realizations of different scenarios. We also provide metrics for the quantitative assessment of realization properties and show them through different agentic implementations of a predictive light sensing scenario. Altogether, this work aims at providing properties, criteria, and metrics for the design and implementation of agentic orchestrations and orchestration of agents.
Agentic AI systems plan, use tools, maintain state, and act across multi-step workflows with external effects, meaning trustworthy deployment can no longer be judged by task completion alone. The current literature remains fragmented across benchmark-centered evaluation, standards-based governance, orchestration architectures, and runtime assurance mechanisms. This paper contributes a bounded evidence synthesis across a manually coded corpus of twenty-four recent sources. The core finding is a governance-to-action closure gap: evaluation tells us whether outcomes were good, governance defines what should be allowed, but neither identifies where obligations bind to concrete actions or how compliance can later be proven. To close that gap, the paper introduces three linked artifacts: (1) a four-layer framework spanning evaluation, governance, orchestration, and assurance; (2) an ODTA runtime-placement test based on observability, decidability, timeliness, and attestability; and (3) a minimum action-evidence bundle for state-changing actions. Across sources, evaluation papers identify safety, robustness, and trajectory-level measurement as open gaps; governance frameworks define obligations but omit execution-time control logic; orchestration research positions the control plane as the locus of policy mediation, identity, and telemetry; runtime-governance work shows path-dependent behavior cannot be governed through prompts or static permissions alone; and action-safety studies show text alignment does not reliably transfer to tool actions. A worked enterprise procurement-agent scenario illustrates how these artifacts consolidate existing evidence without introducing new experimental data.
Automated design and optimization of agentic LLM-based systems leads to sophisticated systems that substantially improve result quality over off-the-shelf agentic patterns. However, studies of fielded agentic systems show that production systems focus much more on issues such as simplicity, controllability, and predictability of inference costs. In this paper we propose principled approaches to designing and optimizing practical agentic systems. We describe an agent framework that enables designers to enforce modularity in agentic systems, by defining "pseudo-tools" that call LLMs recursively on a restricted context. Using this framework we hand-engineer agents for a diverse set of tasks, and show that relative to dynamically-planned workflows, hand-constructed fixed workflows are generally cheaper and more accurate. We then propose novel learning methods for the agentic components required by this framework, namely pseudo-tools and fixed workflows. These learning methods generally outperform hand-engineered agents. We also exploit the modularity of the framework to apply multi-objective optimization methods to jointly optimize cost and response quality and blend the results of multiple learning systems.
Just like traditional BPM systems, agentic BPM systems are built around a specification of the process under consideration. Their distinguishing feature, however, is that the execution of the process is driven by multiple autonomous decision-makers, referred to as agents. Since such agents cannot be fully controlled, the process specification is augmented with explicit objectives, or goals, assigned to the participating agents. Agents then pursue these goals, at least to the best of their efforts, under suitable assumptions on the behavior of others, by adopting appropriate strategies. Centrally, the organization enacting the process can use these specifications to provide guardrails on the decision-making capabilities of agents at the strategy level. This paper sets up the mathematical foundations of such systems in three key settings and analyzes four foundational problems of agentic BPM.
Giuseppe De Giacomo, Timotheus Kampik, Lukas Kirchdorfer +2