LLMs increasingly generate workflow actions and repairs that may be well formed yet stale, infeasible, conflicting, or destructive of their own evidence. We introduce Agentic Transaction Processing (ATP), which treats generated actions as untrusted proposals until deterministic admission accepts them under an executable constraint set C. Its two-sided principle is: a proposal is not truth, and no proposal foresees every disruption. Anything may propose, but only the runtime admits and commits; unforeseen disruptions trigger bounded reactive repair whose output re-enters admission. Mnemosyne realizes ATP with an append-only transition log, effective-state projection, dependency-safe compensation, and active contract records. Under stated assumptions and relative to C, we prove four safety properties (authority separation, serial-equivalent generative admission, evidence-preserving repair, and obligation containment) and establish bounded reactive repair. Across nine safety benchmarks and a four-case Temporal SDK comparison, ATP rejects every targeted violation while admitting valid work. A matched data-size sweep measures 5.2-6.6% incremental throughput cost over the same local durable commit path and exposes local saturation. In a companion scheduling harness, local repair edits nearly an order of magnitude fewer operations than global recompute; a 12-scenario interruption stress test rejects every stale recovery candidate without losing observations or producing invalid commits. Two bounded pilots route 80 proposals from four heterogeneous LLMs through the same gate with zero invalid commits; 24 of 40 mid-execution proposals are admitted and 16 are rejected, including four explicit safety rejections.
Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly entrusted with natural-language workflow instructions (e.g., retail-payment policies) that specify not only what outcome to achieve, but also which steps, branches, and tool interactions are permitted. When these instructions are supplied as prompt context, however, the model retains control over both procedure selection and step execution. As interactions accumulate, an agent can skip required steps, take unsupported branches, or execute a valid step with unsupported arguments or effects--a failure mode we call workflow misalignment. In this work, we propose COVENANT, a compiler-and-interpreter architecture for workflow-aligned agent execution. Our key insight is to treat workflow instructions as source programs rather than prompts. COVENANT converts the instructions into a workflow abstract syntax tree (WAST) and lowers it to a workflow control-flow graph (WCFG). At runtime, a controller interprets the WCFG one node at a time, checks each proposal against requirements extracted from the instructions before committing controller state or advancing the graph, and returns diagnostic feedback for repair. To evaluate COVENANT, we use 120 cases from three existing benchmarks, spanning seven workflow scenarios. Compared with state-of-the-art LLM agents, COVENANT improves benchmark success from 50.00% to 83.33% and reduces the workflow-misalignment failure rate from 42.50% to 15.83% (62.75% relative). These results show that COVENANT substantially mitigates workflow misalignment, moving LLM-agent alignment beyond isolated prompt following toward reliable execution of complex and multi-step workflows.
Large language model systems are increasingly deployed as agentic workflows that interleave reasoning, tool use, memory, and iterative refinement. These systems are effective at producing answers, but they often rely on implicit conversational state, making it difficult to preserve stable work products, isolate irrelevant updates, or propagate changes through intermediate artifacts. We introduce execution lineage: an execution model in which AI-native work is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of artifact-producing computations with explicit dependencies, stable intermediate boundaries, and identity-based replay. The goal is not to make the model a better one-shot writer, but to make evolving AI-generated work maintainable under change. We compare execution-lineage replay against loop-centric update baselines on two controlled policy-memo update tasks. In an unrelated-branch update, DAG replay preserved the final memo exactly in all runs, with zero churn and zero unrelated-branch contamination, while loop baselines regenerated the memo and frequently imported unrelated context. In an intermediate-artifact edit, all systems reflected the new constraint in the final memo, but only DAG replay achieved perfect upstream preservation, downstream propagation, unaffected-artifact preservation, and cross-artifact consistency. These results show that final answer quality and maintained-state quality are distinct. Strong loop baselines can remain competitive at producing polished final outputs when the task is a bounded synthesis/update problem and all current sources fit in context, but immediate task success can mask partial state inconsistency that may compound over future revisions. Execution lineage provides stronger guarantees about what should change, what should remain stable, and how work evolves across revisions.
Giving an AI agent the ability to send emails, query databases, or execute commands is useful--until the agent is tricked into doing something it shouldn't. Prompt injection, hallucinated reasoning, and unsafe tool calls form the primary attack surface for autonomous LLM agents. Existing defenses rely on software checks like system prompts or policy filters running on the same machine the attacker targets, offering no verifiable proof of execution. We introduce Niyam-AI, a framework that makes safety enforcement provable. At session start, permitted tools and constraints are locked into an Intent Contract committed via SHA-256. Every tool call is intercepted and validated by an isolated Judge model; upon passing, a zk-SNARK proof is generated via EZKL. The tool executes only after proof verification, allowing third parties to confirm enforcement without accessing Judge model weights. Evaluating Niyam-AI on 2,000 real-world scenarios from Agent-SafetyBench against NeMo Guardrails, Meta's Llama Prompt Guard 2, and OpenAI's GPT-OSS-Safeguard using 5-fold stratified cross-validation yields an F1 score of 88.5% with a 1.1% false-positive rate (bootstrap 95% CI: [85.19%, 91.88%], N=1000). McNemar's exact paired test confirms significant improvement: Niyam-AI wins 390 discordant scenarios against NeMo (vs 20 losses), 115 against Prompt Guard 2 (vs 13), and 384 against GPT-OSS-Safeguard (vs 19) with p < 0.0001 in all cases. Proof generation adds 2260.6 +/- 218.4 ms per approved action, while verification takes 53.1 +/- 11.8 ms. Niyam-AI provides a guardrail that is both highly accurate and mathematically verifiable--though this reflects a classifier adapted to Agent-SafetyBench evaluated against zero-shot baselines, a distinction discussed in Section IV.C.