cs.CLJul 3, 2026

They Infer What You Meant: Models Represent Communicative Intent More Reliably Than They Act On It

Authors: Alex Kwon

Organizations: Independent Researcher

Abstract

When a person shares something with a language model, the model often answers the surface of the message rather than what the sender was doing by sending it: share a finished project and it critiques the code; share a raw late-night line and it runs a wellness check. We treat the sender's communicative intent, the Gricean what-was-meant, as a first-class interpretability object, and show the failure is one of readout on top of a robust representation. A linear probe decodes the sender's intent, whether they want a thing recognized or evaluated, from a model's default-pass hidden states, cleanly and surface-independently, across six models and four families and in the base checkpoints. The representation generalizes further, to intent that is only pragmatically inferred, and to a second, lexically clean intent (support versus help). The behavioral half of the story, and every causal test, is established on the recognize/evaluate contrast, where what varies is whether the default output acts on the intent. The readout lags the representation in depth within a model (the intent is decodable several layers before it drives the output); across models, which ones act on it by default is model-specific, an observed stratification (three of six show the failure) that we do not read as a scaling law. Where the gap is open, a direction closely tied to the representation, the discriminative direction at a searched-for layer, is a causal handle: steering it recovers the intended behavior, as well as an explicit instruction does and with no prompt at all. This direction is near-orthogonal to the feedback-offering axis, so it routes a represented intent rather than a generic feedback knob, though at the recovery dose the routed intent can override an explicit request. We support each link with controls against obvious deflations and report the nulls as plainly as the confirmations.

Explore similar work

Jun 19, 2025cs.CL

Measuring Intent Comprehension in LLMs

People judge interactions with large language models (LLMs) as successful when outputs match what they want, not what they type. Yet LLMs are trained to predict the next token solely from text input, not underlying intent. Because written language is an imperfect proxy for intent, and correlations between phrasing and desired outcomes can break down in training data, models that rely too heavily on surface cues may respond inconsistently to semantically equivalent prompts. This makes it essential to evaluate whether LLMs can reliably infer user intent-especially in high-stakes settings where robustness and generalization are critical. We introduce a formal framework for assessing intent comprehension in LLMs: whether a model demonstrates robust understanding of user intent by producing consistent outputs across semantically equivalent prompts while differentiating between prompts with distinct intents. Our evaluation approach is based on a variance decomposition of model responses into three components: variability due to user intent, user articulation, and model uncertainty. Models that understand what users want, and are not overly sensitive to textual cues, should attribute most output variance to intent differences, rather than articulation style. Applying this framework across diverse domains, we find that, within the five LLaMA and Gemma models we evaluate, larger models typically assign a greater share of variance to intent, indicating stronger comprehension of intent, although gains are uneven and often modest with increasing model size. These results motivate moving beyond accuracy-only benchmarks toward semantic diagnostics that directly assess whether models understand what users intend.
Nadav Kunievsky, James A. Evans
May 24, 2026cs.HC

Intent Signal Theory: A Computational Framework for Intent-State Control in Human-AI Interaction

Current AI interaction models treat the prompt as the primary object of exchange, omitting a critical layer: the user's latent source intent, the goal state preceding and motivating the prompt. Here we introduce Intent Signal Theory (IST), a computational framework that formalises this missing intent layer. IST distinguishes four objects routinely conflated: latent source intent (I*), observable intent proxy (I-hat), encoded carrier (P), and model output (O). It formalises dimensional weights, encoding masks, structural and fidelity recovery scores, and public-private intent decomposition. The Theorem of Irreversible Intent Loss establishes that private intent absent from the carrier cannot be recovered beyond generic substitution. Evidence from four companion studies spanning six LLMs, three languages and three task domains shows structural-fidelity splits, human-validated metric dissociation, and weight-tolerance plateaus consistent with IST's predictions. IST reframes prompt engineering as intent-protocol design and identifies a computational layer that current AI systems lack.
Gang Peng
Sep 7, 2026cs.LG

Steering Interference Reflects the Model's Defaults, Not the Behavior Directions

Activation steering promises modular control of language model behavior: a behavior such as politeness corresponds to a direction in a model's activations, and adding that direction while it generates should switch the behavior on and leave everything else alone. It does not. We ask what decides which other behaviors move, and by how much, and find that it is the model rather than the behavior being steered. A steer relaxes the model toward a small set of behaviors it already favors, chiefly refusal, sycophancy, and poeticism, and that set is much the same whatever is steered. Three results across 24 behaviors and ten instruction-tuned models support this, every effect read off the generated text by a language-model judge rather than off a probe. That readout matters: all 24 behaviors are linearly decodable, but only 20 change what the model writes. First, a direction carrying no behavioral content, matched to a real steer only in the size of the vector it adds, moves the same behaviors in the same order as real steers do, while producing none of the behaviors that need a specific direction. Second, most interference runs one way, so it cannot be an overlap between two directions: steering profanity makes the model toxic, while steering toxicity leaves profanity untouched. Third, with a behavior held out entirely, geometry measured on the others explains almost none of the interference it takes part in. The account holds on all ten models, the pull toward defaults strongest below 10B parameters and weakening in each family's largest. Reading a steer as a perturbation whose endpoint the model fixes implies that disentangling behavior directions cannot by itself make steering modular.
Srikanth Malla, Chiho Choi, Joon Hee Choi