CausalGame: Benchmarking Causal Thinking of LLM Agents in Games
Authors: Zhenhao Chen, Yongqiang Chen, Chenxi Liu, Junchi Yu, Xiangchen Song, Zijian Li, Jialin Li, Philip Torr, +2 more
Organizations: 1MBZUAI · 2Carnegie Mellon University · 3TMLR Group, Hong Kong Baptist University · University of Oxford · 5New York University
Abstract
Building AI Scientist agents with Large Language Models (LLMs) has recently attracted growing attention. Since scientific discovery fundamentally relies on uncovering causal relationships from observations, the capability of causal thinking, i.e., distinguishing causation from correlation and recognizing hidden biases, is essential to LLM agents. Although a number of benchmarks exist for AI Scientists, none explicitly incorporate challenges from selection bias, measurement error, and hidden confounders that widely exist in real-world scientific discovery. To this end, we present CausalGame, a benchmark that evaluates the causal thinking capabilities of LLM agents through interactive games. CausalGame asks LLM agents to actively design experimental protocols, collect observation data, and derive a final solution with an explanation report. To emulate realistic scientific discovery challenges, we design 14 scenarios that incorporate selection bias, measurement error, and hidden confounders. Across 30 LLM agents, none demonstrates reliable causal thinking: the best model reaches only 68.0% survival against analytical optima of 78-85%, and merely 5-7% of sessions receive credits on the causal-reasoning rubrics. CausalGame provides a scalable and controlled testbed for evaluating the causal thinking of AI Scientist agents.
We introduce CausaLab, a scalable environment for evaluating interactive causal discovery by LLM agents. Unlike prior evaluations, CausaLab evaluates both whether an agent can solve a problem using causal evidence and whether its answer is grounded in a faithful recovered causal mechanism. Each episode places an agent in a synthetic laboratory: it receives prior measurement records, intervenes on a manipulator crystal, and predicts the resonance frequency of a held-out reactor crystal governed by the same mechanism. The hidden data-generating process is a randomly sampled structural causal model (SCM), so success requires recovering both a causal graph and structural equations rather than recalling prior knowledge. Experiments show a persistent gap between prediction and mechanism recovery: in the purely observational 6-node setting, GPT-5.2-high reaches 92% task accuracy but only 0.471 all-edge F1. Mixed observation-intervention strategies improve structural fidelity, while pure intervention remains difficult even for strong agents. We identify premature stopping as a major weakness and show that consistency verification mitigates it. CausaLab therefore separates predictive success from causal understanding and exposes current LLM agents' limits as experimental causal reasoners.
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as integrated data-science agents, combining abstract reasoning with advanced tool use. Yet the relevant benchmark landscape largely divides into symbolic causal reasoning benchmarks without realistic data analysis or data analysis benchmarks without a principled causal data-generating structure. Furthermore, existing causal evaluation datasets are often restricted to curated examples from existing sources, with diversity coming from limited templatized variations rather than from systematic generation of novel synthetic causal structures. We introduce CausalDS, a benchmark for evaluating causal reasoning in agentic data-science workflows. Each benchmark instance is a scene consisting of a sampled structural causal model (SCM) with generated observational data and an accompanying synthetic natural-language story grounded in a realistic domain. We optionally ground the composition of the benchmark components in empirical distributions obtained from real-world datasets, thus retaining empirical structure while reducing the "causal parrot" risk through completely synthetic generation. From each scene, we then derive tasks spanning all three of Pearl's rungs, with typical data-science prediction tasks appearing as Rung 1. Most tasks include a data science coding component, where the model typically needs to use several tools to arrive at the final answer due to the frequent presence of imperfect observations, which are generated by an observation model. Additionally, recognizing when a question admits no warranted answer and abstaining is treated as a first-class scored outcome. The benchmark thus jointly evaluates symbolic causal reasoning, data science, uncertainty quantification, abstention, and tool use/coding.
Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.