cs.CRJul 6, 2026

aiAuthZ: Off-Host, Identity-Bound Authorization for AI Agents

Authors: Sai Varun Kodathala

Organizations: Research & Development SportsVision AI Minnetonka, MN

Abstract

AI agents issue tool calls on the basis of text they cannot verify, so any party who controls part of the context can forge the appearance of authority. I evaluate 15 contemporary language models against eight attack scenarios derived from a published corpus of real agent incidents and find that refusal varies from 100% down to 38% across fully evaluated models; the most expensive model refused only half of the attacks despite a twentyfold price spread. I present aiAuthZ, an authorization gateway that moves the safety decision off the agent's host. Before a tool call executes, the gateway verifies caller identity with a per-message HMAC-SHA256 signature bound to a single-use nonce and a timestamp window, and it evaluates a role-based and argument-level policy that the agent can neither read nor modify. Every decision joins a SHA-256 hash-chained audit log, and each accepted message yields an HMAC-authenticated QR receipt that achieves 94% mean verification across eight transmission channels, with zero forgeries accepted in 25 wrong-key trials. With the gateway in place, residual attack success falls to 0% for all 15 models at no more than 0.03 ms of added decision latency. On the AgentDojo banking suite, aiAuthZ blocks all seven attacker-directed tool calls the evaluated agents emit, at the cost of one legitimate first-time payment, while a spotlighting baseline allows two injections to succeed. Across nine in-scope case studies from the same incident corpus, aiAuthZ blocks nine of nine, against four of nine for a policy baseline without identity binding. The gateway does not prevent a model from being deceived; it prevents a deceived model from acting beyond the verified user's authority on every call routed through it. The implementation and all experiments are released at https://github.com/Sports-Vision-Inc/aiAuthZ.

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