Beyond Accuracy: How Humans Evaluate Legally Correct but Socially Controversial Legal Advice from Machines
Authors: Benjamin Minhao Chen, Zhiyu Li
Organizations: a Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong · b Associate Professor in Law and Policy, Durham Law School, Durham University
Abstract
AI systems are increasingly used to provide legal advice, raising questions about whether laypeople accept guidance from algorithms--especially when that advice is legally correct but socially controversial. We report a preregistered survey experiment with 3,348 adults in mainland China examining how people evaluate identical legal advice when it is attributed either to an AI system or to a human lawyer, and when it is accompanied by reasoning or not. Contrary to expectations of algorithm aversion, attribution to an AI system has no net effect on perceived reasonableness. However, mediation analyses reveal opposing psychological pathways underlying this null result. AI-attributed advice is perceived as more objective, which increases perceived reasonableness, but also as less comprehensive and less attentive to special circumstances, which decreases perceived reasonableness. By contrast, providing legal reasoning substantially increases perceived reasonableness regardless of source, largely by enhancing perceptions of objectivity. Qualitative responses corroborate this tension between objectivity and contextual sensitivity in evaluations of legal advice. Together, these findings suggest that public responses to AI legal advisors are shaped not by rigid attitudes toward automation, but by the balancing of competing normative expectations. The results have implications for theories of algorithm aversion and the design of AI recommendation systems in normatively salient domains.
As people increasingly rely on artificial intelligence (AI) for guidance in their own lives, scholars, lawyers, and even judges have begun to consider the role of AI in legal decision-making. As "silicon sampling" -- the use of generative AI models in social science research -- is now impacting academia, "silicon jurors" could make an appearance in courtrooms. This study joins an emerging line of research on generative AI models' ability to simulate human legal judgments. In particular, we study how large language model (LLM)-powered chatbots respond to series of questions about legal reasonableness. When the law needs to judge the appropriateness of a behavior, it most often asks whether the behavior was "reasonable." Yet despite the ubiquity of reasonableness judgments, they are the site of constant vexation for lawyers, judges, and lay people. Reasonableness seems inherently vague and unpredictable, since it relies on variable context and implicit conceptual schemas. Moreover, many scholars caution that reasonableness judgments may vary along demographic lines. We compare the answers of human participants to those of twenty-six LLMs across twenty-five different legally relevant reasonableness judgments. Overall, our findings suggest that chatbot responses generally track those of human participants. Nonetheless, we find some suggestive -- and potentially concerning -- results. Compared to humans, LLMs generate more homogeneous responses and occasionally treat a variable standard as an invariant rule. And, compared to humans, LLMs tend to generate answers that are more favorable to the government and to corporations. Finally, our results indicate that LLMs' responses tend to align more closely with those of respondents who are white, male, older, and more educated. More systematic research is needed to confirm or reject these initial findings.
Legal reasoning requires distinguishing changes that matter from those that do not. Legal AI should remain stable under legally irrelevant perturbations, but should change when perturbations alter legally material points. We formulate this requirement as a legal-relevance-sensitive evaluation problem: LLMs should only be sensitive to the legally relevant change. We introduce a unified evaluation suite covering should-change and should-not-change evaluation across judicial fairness, robustness, and statute-confusion scenarios. Our evaluation shows that existing legal LLMs are systematically sensitive to legally irrelevant variations and often fail to distinguish related legal elements and statutory rules. To mitigate these failures, we present LexGuard, an adversarial multi-agent framework grounded in formal reasoning. LexGuard formalizes statutes into executable constraints, uses adversarial agents to extract competing fact-statute arguments, and invokes SMT solvers to verify legal satisfaction and logical consistency. Experiments show that LexGuard improves legal reasoning reliability by reducing vulnerability to manipulative framing, improving disambiguation among similar statutes, limiting the influence of legally irrelevant attributes, and increasing consistency under benign reformulations. We show that legal trustworthiness requires not only accuracy, but calibrated sensitivity to legally material changes.
As generative AI increasingly becomes a common source of daily decision-making, including financial choices, it is critical to understand how people evaluate AI-generated financial advice. We conducted a preregistered vignette experiment (N = 285) in which substantive financial content---including facts, numerical values, recommendation direction, and core reasoning---was held constant while communication style varied across AI Financial Assistant (AI), Certified Financial Planner (Expert), and Online Community Forum (OC) advice. Displayed source attribution was independently manipulated through correctly labeled, unlabeled, and mislabeled conditions, allowing us to separate attribution effects from source-specific communication cues. Expert advice was rated more favorably than AI advice on 9 of 10 outcomes (|d|=0.20--0.47), and this advantage remained visible without source labels, where Expert advice outperformed AI advice on 8 of 10 outcomes (up to d=0.60). Correct labels added limited differentiation, whereas mislabeling increased ratings of AI advice for situational fit and overall quality (d=0.42 for each) and attenuated the Expert advantage in situational fit (d=-0.36). Descriptive analyses further showed that AI advice was most responsive to displayed attribution and, conversely, that advice-style differences were most visible under an AI label. These findings show that financial-advice evaluations are shaped jointly by displayed attribution and message-level communication cues. We position disclosure not as a neutral transparency mechanism, but as an interpretive frame whose accuracy and interaction with message cues can shape trust and reliance.
Aryan Ramchandra Kapadia, Eshwar Chandrasekharan, Koustuv Saha