Contextual Procurement Auctions with Bandit Learning

We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$. The problem is challenging even without budgets: the action space is exponential in $M$, the maximum demand of the bidder and the valuation vector (context) varies over time. Exploiting a decomposition of utility across units, we develop polynomial-time learning algorithms based on shortest paths in a directed acyclic graph, obtaining sublinear regret under both full-information and bandit feedback. In the bandit setting, the regret is independent of the number of contexts due to complete cross-learning: observing the utility of the chosen action under the realized context reveals the utility for the same action under all counterfactual contexts. With budget constraints, when the average normalized per-round budget $ρ=\frac{B}{MT}<1$, we design a coupled primal-dual algorithm in which the DAG-based procedure uses dual-adjusted edge weights for primal updates, while online gradient descent updates the dual variable, yielding $ρ$-approximate sublinear regret. Finally, we give implementations whose per-round time and space are independent of the number of contexts, enabling scalability to large or even infinite context spaces.

We study new algorithms for Contextual Bandits with Knapsack. In these problems, there are finitely many types of customers, products, and resources. Each product is made from a fixed combination of resources, and resources have finite capacity. A decision maker must assign each arriving customer one out of a set of multiple possible products. Every assignment of a customer to a product will generate a random reward, which equals an unknown linear function of customer and product features, plus a noise term. The objective is to jointly learn the mean reward function, and to make online assignments to minimize the expected revenue loss relative to an optimal policy that knows the reward function. We propose a natural and simple extension of the Upper-Confidence-Bound (UCB) family of algorithms and apply re-optimization techniques. We show that by taking advantage of re-optimization, our algorithm achieves an average regret of $O(\frac{(\ln T)^3}{T})$ where $T$ is the horizon length. Our bound significantly reduces the $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$ bound in the literature for closely related dynamic-pricing problems that are based on re-optimization.

We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the time elapsed since their last successful bid, with auctions arriving in continuous time and only aggregated feedback revealed at the end of the horizon. Such a bidder must (1) balance the immediate benefit of winning the current auction against its impact on future values and (2) learn unknown environmental parameters. We derive regret bounds for a class of learning methods that combine plug-in estimators with a differential-equation characterization of the optimal policy, and show that a specific confidence bound algorithm learns the optimal policy with a near optimal regret of $\widetilde{O}(\log N)$ for piecewise linear primitives, and $\widetilde{O}(N^{1/3})$ for general, smooth primitives, achieving these regrets without explicit randomization. These theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments.