Measuring Intelligence Beyond Human Scale

As LLM benchmarks saturate, the evaluation community has pursued two strategies to increase difficulty: escalating knowledge demands (GPQA, HLE) or removing knowledge entirely in favor of abstract reasoning (ARC-AGI). The first conflates memorization with capability; the second divorces reasoning from the practical contexts in which it matters. We take a different approach. The Grounded Integration Measure (GIM) is a benchmark of 820 original problems (615 public, 205 private) where difficulty comes from integration; individual problems require coordinating multiple cognitive operations (constraint satisfaction, state tracking, epistemic vigilance, audience calibration) over broadly accessible knowledge, so that reasoning stays grounded in realistic tasks without being gated on specialized expertise. Each problem is an original expert-authored composition, majority with rubric-decomposed scoring (median 6 independently judged criteria). A balanced public--private split provides built-in contamination diagnostic. We calibrate a continuous response 2-parameter logistic (2PL) IRT model over >200k prompt-response pairs across 28 models, producing robust ability estimates that correctly order test-configurations even when raw accuracy is distorted by errors or missing data, addressing a common challenge in benchmark reporting. Using this framework, we present a comprehensive leaderboard spanning 22 models and 47 test-configurations (unique model, thinking-level pairs), and conduct what is to our knowledge the most extensive published study of how test-time compute trades off against model capability on a fixed benchmark: 11 models swept across 35 test-configurations. We observe that within-family configuration choices, such as thinking budget and quantization, matter as much as model selection. We release the evaluation framework, calibrated IRT parameters, and all public problems.

We introduce the Generalized Turing Test (GTT), a formal framework for comparing the capabilities of arbitrary agents via indistinguishability. For agents A and B, we define the Turing comparator A $\geq$ B to hold if B, acting as a distinguisher, cannot reliably distinguish between interactions with A (instructed to imitate B) and another instance of B. This yields a dataset- and task-agnostic notion of relative intelligence. We study the comparator's structure, including conditions under which it is transitive and therefore induces an ordering over equivalence classes, and we define and analyze variants with querying, bounded interaction, and fixed distinguishers. To complement the theory, we instantiate the framework on a collection of modern models, empirically evaluating pairwise indistinguishability across thousands of trials. The resulting comparisons exhibit a stratified structure consistent with existing rankings, hinting that the proposed framework yields meaningful empirical orderings. Our results position indistinguishability as a unifying lens for reasoning about intelligence, suggesting a foundation for evaluation and, potentially, training objectives that are inherently independent of fixed datasets or benchmarks.

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and regulate one's own reasoning, remains under-evaluated in AI benchmarking. We introduce MEDLEY-BENCH, a benchmark of behavioural metacognition that separates independent reasoning, private self-revision, and socially influenced revision under genuine inter-model disagreement. The benchmark evaluates 35 models from 12 families on 130 ambiguous instances across five domains and reports two complementary scores: the Medley Metacognition Score (MMS), a tier-based aggregate of reflective updating, social robustness, and epistemic articulation, and the Medley Ability Score (MAS), derived from four metacognitive sub-abilities. Results show a robust evaluation/control dissociation: evaluation ability increases with model size within families, whereas control does not. In a follow-up progressive adversarial analysis of 11 models, we observed two behavioural profiles, i.e., models that revise primarily in response to argument quality and models that track consensus statistics. Under within-model relative profiling (ipsative scoring), evaluation was the weakest relative ability in all 35 models, indicating a systematic knowing/doing gap. Smaller and cheaper models often matched or outperformed larger counterparts, suggesting that metacognitive competence is not simply a function of scale. These findings position MEDLEY-BENCH as a tool for measuring belief revision under social pressure and suggest that future training should reward calibrated, proportional updating rather than output quality alone.