Overthinking: Amplifying Reasoning Weights to Extract Learned Secrets

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting is widely used as a reasoning aid and is often treated as a transparency mechanism. Yet behavioral gains under CoT do not imply that the model's internal computation causally depends on the emitted reasoning text, i.e. models may produce fluent rationales while routing decision-critical computation through latent pathways. We introduce a causal, layerwise audit of CoT faithfulness based on activation patching. Our key metric, the CoT Mediation Index (CMI), isolates CoT-specific causal influence by comparing performance degradation from patching CoT-token hidden states against matched control patches. Across multiple model families (Phi, Qwen, DialoGPT) and scales, we find that CoT-specific influence is typically depth-localized into narrow ''reasoning windows,'' and we identify bypass regimes where CMI is near-zero despite plausible CoT text. We further observe that models tuned explicitly for reasoning tend to exhibit stronger and more structured mediation than larger untuned counterparts, while Mixture-of-Experts models show more distributed mediation consistent with routing-based computation. Overall, our results show that CoT faithfulness varies substantially across models and tasks and cannot be inferred from behavior alone, motivating causal, layerwise audits when using CoT as a transparency signal.

Large language models often answer complex reasoning questions without revealing intermediate steps, raising whether they reason latently or complete patterns. We propose the Hidden CoT Detection Score (HCDS), a comparative behavioral and mechanistic signal measuring whether neutral-prompt behavior aligns more closely with explicit CoT or explicit no- CoT. Here, hidden CoT operationally denotes this neutral-prompt CoT-like alignment; HCDS does not directly observe or prove an unexposed reasoning trace. On GSM8K, HCDS is significantly positive for both Qwen3-4B variants (Thinking $+1.87$, $p = 1.2 \times 10^{-7}$; Instruct $+1.41$, $p = 1.9 \times 10^{-4}$), replicates across a different inference stack and quantization within $0.08$ ($+1.80$ and $+1.45$), and is not significantly positive in seven of eight length-adjusted calibration-control cells. The unadjusted score produces large positive scores on single-step arithmetic and numeric factual lookup. The variants also respond differently to no-CoT instructions: Instruct complies from the prompt alone, whereas Thinking continues reasoning and requires intervention. These findings show stronger, less prompt-conditional CoT-like behavior in the reasoning-tuned model, consistent with but not proof of latent reasoning. HCDS thus investigates latent reasoning without relying on models' self-reported traces.