Abstract
The rise of LLM-based agents with reasoning, summarization, and memory capabilities has created a new threat surface for online content that conventional defenses fail to address. Existing defenses like access controls can be circumvented by agents mimicking ordinary browsers, and injection-based defenses often degrade human readability. In this paper, we revisit the agent pipeline and identify context compression, which agents routinely invoke to fit context budgets, as a critical yet overlooked defense layer. We propose CAPE, a framework that protects high-value textual content by injecting invisible perturbations without changing its human-visible surface form, thereby inducing severe information loss during agent compression. CAPE extracts disruptive seed perturbations from an accessible surrogate compressor, then adapts them to query-only target compressors through prior-guided evolution and preference-calibrated candidate prioritization, achieving effective protection under a low query budget. Experiments on three content types and four compression settings show that CAPE improves information loss by up to 75.8% over the strongest baseline while keeping protected content visually indistinguishable from originals. CAPE also transfers to real-world settings, including the LangGraph agent workflow and GitHub Copilot, highlighting its generality and practical value. This paper aims to reveal context compression as a new defense layer, promoting content protection research in the agent era.
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