A Theory of Least Autonomy in AI

As AI systems increasingly exhibit agentic behavior, discussions of autonomy often conflate what systems are technically capable of doing with what they should be permitted to do in practice. This paper introduces a governance framework that explicitly separates Allowed Autonomy Levels (AAL), which define the degree of autonomy an AI agent is authorized to exercise given risk, oversight, and accountability considerations, from Autonomous Capability Levels (ACL), which characterize an agent's inherent technical abilities. We present a structured set of autonomy levels spanning reactive execution, decision support, supervised action, goal-directed autonomy, and delegated operational authority, and describe how control, reversibility, and accountability change as autonomy increases. To operationalize this framework, we propose a risk-aware decision process for assigning allowed autonomy, analyze how risk and accountability evolve across autonomy levels, and demonstrate its application through a deployed enterprise data engineering agent, illustrating how a system assessed at a high capability level can be deliberately constrained to a lower allowed autonomy based on risk, reversibility, and organizational readiness. By distinguishing authorization from capability, this work provides practical guidance for the design, deployment, and governance of Agentic AI systems.

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

The security discussion around agentic AI focuses heavily on prompt injection. This paper argues that multi-agent systems also create a distinct authorization problem: maintaining authorization invariants as non-human principals retrieve data, delegate tasks, and synthesize results across changing boundaries. We call this problem authorization propagation. It is not reducible to prompt injection and is not fully addressed by classical access-control models such as RBAC, ABAC, or ReBAC. The paper formalizes authorization propagation as a workflow-level property, identifies three sub-problems (transitive delegation, aggregation inference, and temporal validity), and derives seven structural requirements for authorization architectures in multi-agent AI systems. Recent work on invocation-bound capability tokens, task-scoped authorization envelopes, dependency-graph policy enforcement, and execution-count revocation demonstrates that the field is converging on the problem, but not yet on a complete architecture. The central claim is that identity governance must be treated as infrastructure: evaluated continuously, enforced at every interaction boundary, and designed into the system before orchestration logic is allowed to scale. Preliminary implementation evidence from a production enterprise AI platform shows that ordinary system behavior, not only adversarial action, already produces the failures this model predicts.