LLMs as a Jury: Cross-Model Consensus Can Outperform Process Reward Models for LLM Reasoning

Improving reasoning LLMs requires the ability to judge the quality of long reasoning traces for effective reasoning data curation, strong training signals during reinforcement learning, and an in-depth understanding of reasoning behaviors during model performance evaluation. Additionally, surfacing reasoning mistakes that the model makes would enable improving the model's performance at runtime through providing feedback. Due to the difficulty of this complex task on long reasoning traces, single-model judges (even frontier models) do not do well at identifying reasoning defects. Additionally, leveraging frontier models during online training of reasoning LLMs is generally prohibited due to guardrails in terms of use. In this work, we introduce Reasoning Jury, a system that replaces the single judge with a jury of LLMs and a moderated consensus mechanism, to improve the fidelity of judgments for identifying reasoning defects. In reasoning jury, defects of a reasoning trace and their severity are surfaced through a deliberation where a moderator conducts a discussion amongst the jury where the jurors critique each other's judgments and get to modify their initial votes. The moderator derives a consensus through deliberation amongst jurors or consolidation of judgements. We show that Reasoning Jury with a jury of open-weight models (e.g., gpt-oss-120b) is able to significantly outperform frontier models (opus-4.6, sonnet-4.6, and gemini-3.1-pro) at correctly identifying reasoning defects. Besides accuracy performance improvements, the aggregated cost of the jury (initial verdicts, deliberations, consolidation, etc.) is a fraction (8 to 15%) of the cost of running frontier models in LLM-as-a-judge setup. We also show how these judgements can be leveraged to understand failure modes of reasoning LLMs on benchmarks, which allows much deeper understanding of a model's performance.

LLM-as-judge (Zheng et al., 2023) is increasingly the default for evaluating AI systems in enterprise pipelines, often scaled to ensembles (Verga et al., 2024) or "mixture-of-experts" (Shazeer et al., 2017) panels of judges. These systems share a key assumption: that consistency -- agreement among judges, or among a model's own samples -- indicates correctness. We show this assumption is unreliable. Agreement is not accuracy: a model can agree with itself, and different models can agree with each other, out of shared bias, a memorized heuristic, or an option-position prior rather than truth. We ask when agreement is nonetheless a usable proxy, in a large-scale cross-runner study: 53 runners drew K=50 samples for assigned overlapping cases across comparisons of model tier, prompting, and scale on GPQA Diamond and AIME -- 265,000 samples. Using majority-correctness as the deployment label and a hierarchical runner-clustered bootstrap, agreement is a positive but weak predictor (rho 0.20-0.59, all positive under item-clustered resampling) whose usefulness is regime-dependent: best for unsaturated mid-tier models and for allocating compute, and worst -- over-confident yet no more accurate -- for the most consistent frontier model (agreement >=0.8 on 77% of GPQA case-result entries, 48% of those wrong). An exploratory cross-family check on three Claude tiers shows the same frontier over-confidence, with confident errors recurring across providers above a marginal-preserving null. Self-consistency is thus a conditional proxy for correctness, not a standalone confidence score. We publicly release the de-identified per-run rows and answer distributions.

LLM-as-a-judge panels aggregate votes from multiple models, with the expectation that diverse models yield more reliable evaluations. We develop a framework to measure the true informational value of such panels and quantify how far their reliability falls short of the independent-voting ideal. Testing a panel of 9 frontier LLMs from 7 model families on three natural language inference datasets (each with 100 human annotations per item), we find that the 9 judges effectively provide only about 2 independent votes' worth of information. Roughly three-quarters of the panel's nominal independence is lost because the models make the same mistakes on the same items. The consequences are stark: the panel's actual accuracy falls 8-22 percentage points short of what independent voting would achieve, and the best single judge matches or outperforms the full panel across all conditions. Neither adding more judges nor using smarter aggregation algorithms helps -- established methods close at most 11% of this gap, even with access to the correct answers. We quantify these findings using the Kish effective sample size (n_eff) and a Condorcet null model, and show the deficit is robust across prompt variants, temperatures, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a pairwise preference task (RewardBench). The bottleneck is correlated judges, not the aggregation algorithm, implying that scaling up panels cannot substitute for genuinely independent evaluation.