First-Order Modal Logic in HOL: Deep and Shallow Embeddings with Automated Faithfulness (Extended Preprint)

In Isabelle/HOL, we apply the deep-and-shallow embedding methodology of our prior work to monadic second-order logic (MSO). Three embeddings are developed side by side: a deep embedding (an inductive datatype with an explicit satisfaction relation); a maximal-shallow embedding that translates the connectives and quantifiers directly into HOL, carrying the interpretation and both assignments explicitly; and a minimal-shallow embedding -- a locale that fixes those parameters, collapsing the formula type to bool. The enabling new ingredient is a two-sorted substitution apparatus -- capture-avoiding substitution, renaming, and a substitution lemma per namespace -- in which each binder is transparent for the other; faithfulness of all three embeddings is mechanised and largely automated. Our central contribution is a fully mechanised two-sorted downward Loewenheim-Skolem theorem: the minimal embedding recovers deep validity relative to the (countable) assignment ranges, and this range-relative reading is shown to coincide with the general (Henkin-style) reading of MSO, whereas the standard reading validates strictly more formulas, witnessed by comprehension. Both readings are nonetheless recovered from the minimal embedding, differing only in the admitted interpretations: all of them for the general reading, only the elementary substructures of the full model for the standard. We exercise the embeddings on classical MSO landmarks: the Boolean-closure and graph schemata hold under the full second-order domain yet fail in the minimal embedding, making the dichotomy concrete, while reachability and 2-colorability are refuted throughout.

This position statement looks back on two decades of work on shallow embeddings of non-classical logics in classical higher-order logic (HOL), a line of research that expanded into a range of logic embeddings in HOL and inspired the LogiKEy logic-pluralistic knowledge representation and reasoning methodology. This paper advances the case for logical pluralism at object-logic level within a unifying meta-logical framework such as LogiKEy, grounding the argument in computational metaphysics. More broadly, it advocates principled support for logical pluralism in modern proof assistants, and cautions against logical imperialism -- the rigid adoption of a single foundational logic for large-scale theory developments -- which impedes the interdisciplinary reuse that LogiKEy is designed to enable.

Reasoning about necessity and possibility depends on assumptions about accessibility between worlds and about which objects exist at each one. The same inference may therefore hold under one modal system and fail under another. Evaluating language models on such problems requires testing whether their judgments follow the stated semantics rather than a familiar logic. We construct paired modal problems with identical premises and conjecture but different frame or domain conditions; automated reasoning verifies opposite labels. A balanced core prevents the semantic condition alone from revealing the answer. On this core, four of five recent models perform below the condition-only baseline under direct prompting. Yet enabling reasoning mode raises DeepSeek V4 Flash from 4.4% to 88.1% on unchanged prompts. Following stipulated modal semantics thus depends strongly on inference mode as well as model identity. When frame conditions are omitted, models often agree but fit different familiar logics best. We release the formulas, oracle artifacts, countermodels, and responses.