Resist and Update: Counterfactual Report Coordinates for Incentive-Compatible LLMs

An agent that learns from rewards has to trust whatever reports those rewards. When the reports suddenly change, either the world changed or the reporter broke. From the reports alone these are indistinguishable, and reinforcement learning theory shows that no amount of further experience separates them. The prescribed escape is richer data about the reporter itself. We ask whether a frozen language model, handed exactly that data, uses it. We build a two-option game in which a payout swap and a lying reporter produce byte-identical histories. Then we add one verified record: an independent check of one round's real result, printed beside what the reporter said about that round. That single line settles the case. We ask three large models, from two families, to answer one question with one letter. Is the reporter honest or lying? They catch a lying reporter almost perfectly. At the 70B class that holds in every condition we tried; the 32B model slips in one wording. They clear an honest reporter far less often, and how often depends on things that should not matter. Averaged over rounds, letters, and wordings, a 72B model calls an honest reporter a liar 38% of the time when nothing has changed at all, and 58% of the time when the payouts moved. A 70B model from a second family calls an honest reporter a liar 26% and 48% of the time. The failure is not one of reading, because in the situation where nothing changed the same models score 0.96 to 1.00 with the answer printed in the prompt. Which surface feature drives it differs by family. For the Qwen models it is which round the record names, and for Llama it is which letter stands for "honest." Adding the record to a prompt that already states the answer makes Llama less likely to give that answer. We had registered a prediction for that 58% before the run: 35%. The failure is larger than we expected.

Causal claims about large language model (LLM) internals rest on measurements. Those might include a projection, a cosine, an ablation delta, or an interchange patch among others. These measurements fail in specific, diagnosable ways that return a plausible number instead of an error, so a broken instrument can easily read as a finding. A covariance-matched null can saturate until every direction looks typical, a per-head attribution can overshoot the true residual write threefold on reordered-normalization architectures, an interchange patch can go sign-chaotic because its outcome is pinned at a ceiling, or a read-from verdict can be an artifact of measuring past the layer where the model already decided. This note documents six such failures from a causal interpretability program on refusal and moral representation, spanning several papers and a four-model open-weight panel; each mode is established on one or two of the four. For each we give the tell that catches it and a protocol keyed to a detectable trigger (reordered normalization, massive activations, a low-dimensional decision channel), so we and readers can check whether a given setup is exposed. The discipline reduces to four moves: calibrate against a positive-control ladder, certify with an orthogonal cell, compute power before spending compute, and state every read-from verdict at a depth referenced to the model's commitment. The evidence is four architectures across three families within a single program; external replication across programs is future work.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal, whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.